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The original Superman television series captured the hearts and
minds of many American children. Every week, as the picture on
the screen dissolved into an image of Superman superimposed over
an American flag, the announcer solemnly proclaimed (accompa-
nied by stirring music) that Superman was fighting for "Truth, Jus-
tice, and the American Way."1 To this watching child, and perhaps
to the nation, Truth, Justice and the American Way seemed tangi-
ble and definite, as clearly visible as the flag that waved in the
background.
Today the "American Way" is splintered into many paths. Old
truths are being questioned; government "reinvented." Once there
was (or at least so it seemed) unity; now Truth and Justice seem so
fragmented that some say there is no Truth, only truths.
Taxation is one of the many areas in which the old Truth(s) are
being re-examined. The progressive income tax system, which has
been the ideal tax since it was established over 80 years ago, is now
challenged vigorously as an unfair tax by many lay people, politi-
cians, and commentators. Some claim a flat or proportionate in-
come tax is fairer, while others aver that a consumption-based (or
expenditure-based) tax is the only just tax.2
One common criticism of the current tax system, with its various
deductions and loopholes, is that it is contradictory, and even inco-
* Professor of Law, Tulane Law School. I would like to thank Professors Adeno
Addis, Lynne Henderson, and Lewis Kornhauser for their thoughtful readings of pre-
vious versions of this article. Thanks also to Heather Conahan, Anna Moses, and Bob
Ripley for their research assistance and Tulane Law School for a grant which sup-
ported this research.
1. The reflective adult wonders why the saying was Truth, Justice, and the Ameri-
can Way. Wasn't the American Way supposed to be truth and justice? Watergate, the
Iran-Contra affair, and Whitewater made clear that there is a distinction. Perhaps the
announcer was prescient.
2. House Ways and Means Chairman Bill Archer (R-Tex.) has even called for the
repeal of the Sixteenth Amendment, which gave Congress the power to tax income.
Clay Chandler, Archer Calls For End to Income-Based Tax, WASH. POST, June 6, 1995,
at Dl; Testimony of Bill Archer, House Ways & Means Tax Code Revision Hearings,
June 6, 1995 (on file with author).
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herent.3 Critics contrast this chaotic system with purer, simpler,
fairer tax systems such as a flat tax or a consumption tax. How-
ever, the critics are contrasting apples and oranges: a real tax with
an ideal tax. It is true that either an ideal flat income tax or an
ideal consumption-based tax would be simpler and more coherent
than the current progressive tax; however, an ideal progressive tax
would be simpler as well. What makes the current tax complex and
contradictory is not inherent in an ideal, hypothetical progressive
income tax. Rather, the complexity and contradictions stem from
Americans' complex sense of distributive justice. Our perception
of what is a fair or just tax is not based on a single principle of
justice, but on several principles which are contradictory to some
extent. The compromises created by our multi-faceted sense of dis-
tributive justice would create stress and strain on any ideal tax,
eventually causing it to bend and stretch to accommodate these
contradictory principles. A real tax-unlike an ideal tax-always
will be contradictory because our beliefs are contradictory. Conse-
quently, even if we start out with a pure flat income tax or a pure
consumption tax, inevitably the tax will develop many of the same
features as the present tax.
The current tax debate appears to pit conflicting truths about the
nature of a just tax against each other. This appearance is false; in
reality most Americans do not accept one truth or the other.
Rather, most Americans accept to some extent all the truths. We
share fluid and contradictory beliefs about distributive justice and a
fair tax.
This Article explores the principles of distributive justice which
underlie the current American tax system. While a universal Jus-
tice may exist in theory, in reality "Justice" is replaced by culture-
bound "justices"-particularistic and contextual-rooted in the so-
cieties which they shape and which, in turn, shape them. Similarly,
there is no universal Truth in taxation. A tax is just or fair only for
a particular society and only to the extent that it supports and fur-
thers the normative goals of that society. As a consequence, this
Article takes a particularistic approach to distributive justice and
3. For example, it is a mixture of an income tax and a consumption tax in that
certain corporate and individual business transactions and savings are exempted from
taxation. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 361 (providing for non-recognition of certain corpo-
rate gains and losses), 404 (providing for deductions for contributions of an employer
to an employee trust or annuity plan), and 1031 (providing for nontaxable exchanges
of certain business and investment property).
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taxation. Therefore, although it examines abstract general theo-
ries of justice and theories of taxation, it focuses on the particular
context that molds American taxation: our historical and political
tradition. Specifically, this Article asserts that the American sense
of distributive justice and hence taxation rests on the twin founda-
tional principles of America-liberty and equality. These princi-
ples have various meanings; under some definitions, liberty and
equality are compatible, but most frequently they are in conflict.
Nevertheless, a broad spectrum of the American people endorse
particular conceptions of liberty and equality that support a mildly
progressive hybrid income-consumption tax. In the tax field the
battle between liberty and equality-often characterized as one be-
tween efficiency and equity-occurs primarily in two fundamental
areas: choice of the tax base and choice of a rate structure. 5 Of
course base and rates issues can conflate. For example, an "in-
come" tax that permits the tax-free exchange of certain invest-
4. See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE XiV (1983) (arguing his point
from the particularistic standpoint of the cave, rather than from the mountain top,
because, as he says, "Justice and equality can conceivably be worked out as philosoph-
ical artifacts, but a just or an egalitarian society cannot be."). See also, Grezegorz
Lissowski et al., Principles of Distributive Justice: Experiments in Poland and
America, 35 CONFLICT RESOLUTION 98, 116 (1991) (commenting that "abstract ci-
phers lack the prerequisites for developing conception of justice") (citation omitted).
In contradistinction, John Rawls does not consider his theory or political philoso-
phy in general as a withdrawing from society. Rather, he views abstractions such as
the original position as necessary, because they are
a way of continuing public discussion when shared understandings of
lesser generality have broken down. We should be prepared to find that the
deeper the conflict, the higher the level of abstraction to which we must
ascend to get a clear and uncluttered view of its roots. Since the conflicts in
the democratic tradition about the ... basis of cooperation for a footing of
equality have been persistent, we may suppose they are deep.... Seen in
this context, formulating ... abstract conceptions of society and person con-
nected with those fundamental ideas is essential to finding a reasonable
political conception of justice.
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 46 (1993) [hereinafter RAWLS, LIBERALISM].
See also Stephen M. Griffin, Political Philosophy versus Political Theory: The Case of
Rawls, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 691 (1994) for a discussion of political philosophy as
compared to political theory. Griffin points out Rawls' own emphasis, especially in
Political Liberalism, that Rawls' theory is a political one which uses society's own
ideas of justice "as [a] reasonable way of organizing and justifying at least some of the
beliefs [society] already hold[s]." Griffin at 706.
5. Tax base refers to the domain which will be subject to the tax-income, con-
sumption, sales, or earned income, for example. The rate structure, of course, refers
to whether the rate of tax should be flat or proportionate (10% on the entire base),
progressive or graduated (increasing rates applied to greater quantities-10% on the
first $10,000 of sales, income, etc., 20% on the next $10,000), digressive (a flat tax
applied to the base after a certain amount-say the first $10,000-is exempted), or
even regressive.
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ments, or that allows savings to accumulate tax-free in a pension
fund until withdrawn for consumption, has a zero tax rate on those
savings and investments. In reality, this is a hybrid tax-part in-
come, part consumption-based.
Part I of this Article summarizes various formal theories of jus-
tice and of income taxation. Part II explores the nature of the
American perception of justice. First, it provides an overview of
the two political concepts that have shaped our country-liberty
and equality. It then summarizes the American tradition which I
have labeled "moral economic individualism," that articulates the
meanings of liberty and equality that resonate most strongly within
our national psyche. Part III surveys empirical evidence of Ameri-
can beliefs about distributive justice and taxation. The Article con-
cludes that American beliefs in liberty and equality support a
mildly progressive hybrid income-consumption tax, rather than a
pure income tax or a flat-rate consumption tax. Such a tax ac-
knowledges the pluralistic meanings of liberty and equality under
the unifying umbrella of a fluid and flexible conception of a fair
tax.
I. The Income Tax and Theories of Justice
Taxation, with its mathematical precision, appears to be a scien-
tific field, neatly detached from messy normative issues. This, how-
ever, is not the case because taxation is inseparable from the
society that produces it. Consequently, "[a] theory of taxation is
necessarily bound up with fundamental questions of political sci-
ence, economics and ethics."'6 Nevertheless, general theories of
justice often pay little attention to taxation; when they do, their
6. STEPHEN F. WESTON, PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE IN TAXATION 1 (1903). For Wes-
ton, natural rights were the foundation of taxation. Id. at 39. Therefore, the ethical
goal of taxation was the individual. Id. at 41. See also A Discussion of "The Ideolo-
gies of Taxation," 18 TAX L. REV. 1, 22 (1962) ("[T]here are no ideal solutions to suit
everybody. Any intelligent thinking on taxes eventually reaches the ultimate purpose
of life on this planet as each of us conceives it.") (statement of discussion participant
Louis Eisenstein). Cf HAROLD GROVES, TAX PHILOSOPHERS 25 (1974) ("There may
be some universal truths in taxation, but they are dwarfed by the constraints of a
particular environment."). Or as Thomas Griffith has recently written:
The correct relationship between normative goals and the choice of tax
base is simply stated. First, the policy maker should adopt explicit normative
goals. Next, she should choose a tax base which will help achieve those
goals. Different tax bases will be "ideal" depending upon the particular nor-
mative goals which are selected.
Thomas Griffith, Should "Tax Norms" Be Abandoned? Rethinking Tax Policy Analy-
sis and the Taxation of Personal Injury Recoveries, 1993 WIs. L. REV. 1115, 1152-53
(1993).
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conclusions often differ both from reality and from what people
intuitively believe ought to exist. More disturbingly, the existing
tax system may not even reflect society's beliefs because of flaws in
the political system,7 or alternatively because of cognitive errors.8
Despite these factors, a brief examination of the general theories of
justice, and the specific theories of taxation help to articulate the
issues involved in analyzing the nature of a fair tax.
A. Methodology in the Determination of the Justice of
Taxation
The method of determining whether a tax is just depends on
whether that justness can be determined independently of the just-
ness of the pre-tax wealth distribution. There are two possible situ-
ations. In the first, the justness of the tax is independent of the
justness of the pre-tax wealth distribution. Consequently, a just tax
is simply one that distributes fairly the tax burdens-the revenues
of which will be used to provide approved public goods-and will
not disturb the pre-tax distribution. Redistribution of income is
not a permissible tax function under this view.
Conversely, in the second situation, the justness of a tax is re-
lated to the justness of the pre-tax distribution. Consequently, the
tax may serve a re-distributive function in addition to its role as a
collection vehicle to fund governmental duties.
Under this second situation the determination of a just tax is a
two step process. First, one must determine whether the existing
distribution of goods is just.9
The second step then distributes the burden of taxation. The
second step depends on the results of the first step. If under the
7. For example, when one political faction captures the reins of government, it
uses that power to perpetuate and expand itself. Robert Stanley sees the tax system-
especially the income tax-as a means of supporting the capitalist establishment. See
generally ROBERT STANLEY, DIMENSIONS OF LAW IN THE SERVICE OF ORDER: ORI-
GINS OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX, 1861-1913 (1993).8. See, e.g., EDWARD J. MCCAFFREY, A COGNITIVE THEORY OF TAXATION 59
(1994) (arguing that cognitive theory shows such a pervasiveness of errors in how we
perceive taxation that it is difficult to say that our current system of taxation may not
reflect our morality). On the other hand, what we perceive as correct is influenced by
our perceptions of what actually is-or rather what we believe to exist. Michael L.
Roberts & Peggy A. Hite, Progressive Taxation, Fairness, and Compliance, 16 LAW &
POL'Y 27, 28 (1994) (observing that the average tax rates which survey respondents in
the $5,000 to $100,000 income range felt were fair were closely tied to marginal rates,
whereas the absolute dollar amounts they assessed as fair were slightly higher than,
but still corresponded to, actual effective rates).
9. Of course, this determination depends on a prior determination of what is a
"just" distribution.
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first step, the pre-tax distribution was determined to be unjust,
then the second step requires not simply a just or fair distribution
of the tax burdens but also a redistribution of the wealth. Alterna-
tively, if the pre-tax distribution were just, then no redistribution is
required. A just tax would fairly distribute the burdens of taxation
without altering pre-tax distribution. The ultimate effect would be
the same as in the first situtation where pre-tax distribution was not
considered at all.10
Such discussions about a just tax are often confused and/or over-
simplified for several reasons. First, people frequently do not artic-
ulate whether the justness of a tax is determined independently of
the pre-tax distribution; that is, they do not specify whether the tax
should have a redistributive function. Second, if redistribution is a
function of a just tax, many people fail to distinguish between the
distribution of the tax benefits (the redistributive function), and
the distribution of tax burdens.
Consider, for example, Representative Dick Armey's (R-Tex.)
statement in connection with the introduction of his 1994 tax bill
proposing a flat or proportionate tax: "Fairness is in fact the flat
tax's great virtue. It's based on the idea of fairness we learned in
grade school: Everyone would be treated the same."" His state-
ment ignores the redistribution issue. He does not indicate
10. Although these two steps are related, they are separate. For example, in a
society consisting of A and B, A earns $10,000 and B earns $100,000, and the govern-
ment needs $5000 to fulfill its functions as conceived by A and B. Under the first
step, we must decide whether the distribution of wealth is just. The distribution of
wealth between A and B is just if society's conception of justice is that each individual
is entitled to the amount earned through her efforts. However, this step does not
necessarily require that the burden be distributed equally, $2500 to A and to B. We
must consider: (i) the individual's relationship to society as a whole, (ii) whether the
burden of taxation should be shared equally, and (iii) what equally means. If we
determine that the pre-tax distribution is not just, then the tax system must distribute
the $5000 tax burden between A and B, and it must redistribute some of society's
goods by transferring some money from B to A.
11. Dick Armey, Review Merits of Flat Tax, WALL ST. J., June 16, 1994, at A20;
accord Flat Tax Proposals: Senate Hearing 104-209, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., at 44, 93(1995) (Rep. Armey). Compare Robert M. Willan, Ugly Truths of the Progressive
Income Tax, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 1985, at A14 (arguing that "there is no justification
on grounds of either fairness or morality for the progressive income tax"). Armey's
bill, the Freedom and Fairness Restoration Act, was introduced on June 16, 1994, and
provides for a low flat tax on individual earnings, coupled with a flat business tax
which permits the immediate deduction or expensing of tangible property. See id.; see
also H.R. 4585, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 101-102 (1995). In fact, when the effects of
an income exemption are factored in, Armey's flat tax has some progressivity. For
example, consider a flat tax of 20% on all income in excess of $20,000. A earns$30,000 and B earns $40,000. A pays 20% of $10,000 or $2000 in taxes. B pays $4000.
A's effective tax rate is 6.7%, whereas B's is 10%.
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whether he ignores redistribution because (i) he believes a fair tax
is determined independently of the distribution of benefits, or (ii)
he believes distribution of benefits is connected to the determina-
tion of a fair tax, but no redistributive element is needed because
the pre-tax distribution is fair.
Armey's failure to treat the distribution of tax burdens also lacks
clarity because he assumes there is only one definition of fairness.
He defines fairness as treating everyone the same, and he equates
sameness with a proportionate or flat tax. He then assumes that
there is only one meaning to treating people "the same." In fact,
there are many ways people can be treated the same, or equally,
and each way is based on a normative judgment.
The simplest, most obvious method of treating everyone equally
is to give everyone identical benefits and burdens. Everyone, for
example, has the same right (duty) to receive (contribute) $100.
This interpretation appears uncontroversially fair. What if, how-
ever, in a society consisting solely of A and B, A has no money and
B has $1 million? What if the good to be distributed evenly is
bread and A is allergic to it? Or books written in Hungarian which
B reads but not A? Or anchovy pizzas which B likes but A does
not? Similarly, identical burdens (such as a tax) are not always
fair. Prohibiting everyone from sleeping on park benches is equal
or fair treatment-but only in a narrow sense of the word if A is
homeless and B lives in a mansion. Certainly, the fairness of re-
quiring everyone to donate a kidney to the organ transplant bank is
questionable when A has two healthy kidneys and B has only one.
Representative Armey's proposal to treat everyone the "same"
is not quite this simple: he does not mean identical amounts but
rather identical proportions.12 Assume, for example, that our soci-
ety of A and B has $200 to distribute (or collect). Instead of dis-
tributing (collecting) $100 from A and $100 from B, society
determines that the allocation will be proportionately the same.
The question is: proportionate to what-income, wealth, ability,
need, effort, moral worthiness? A and B may not be able to agree
on the appropriate base. Different bases may be appropriate for
different distributions (collections).
Even if people do agree on a base, they may differ as to how to
define or measure it. What, for example, is moral worthiness, and
how is it measured? Even if people agree on how to define the
base, its application across a broad spectrum of situations is more
12. Assuming there is no exemption amount, or alternatively ignoring it, as Armey
seemed to be doing, a flat tax takes the same proportion of tax from each.
1996]. 613
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complicated than it might appear at first glance. Assume, for ex-
ample, that income is the chosen base. Consider a simple situation
in which society consists of two individuals, A and B, who are iden-
tical twins. This year A receives a total of $30,000 and B receives
$1 million. Assume they receive the money for the alternative rea-
sons: (i) as a return on investments of equal amounts in the oil
industry, (ii) as a result of their personal efforts at their respective
jobs, (iii) as a result of winning lottery tickets, and (iv) as an inheri-
tance from their parents. Are the distributions to A and B just in
each of these situations? If the government needs revenues of
$10,000, how should the tax burden be distributed between A and
B? Should the burden be the same in each situation?
While there is not agreement on any one principle of distributive
justice, common principles include, for example, per capita distri-
butions, and distributions based on needs, merit, or requirements
of the common good (general welfare). Some of these principles
are principles of desert, that is, the recipient deserves or merits the
distribution because of some personal characteristic such as ability,
effort, or even ascription. Other principles of distribution, such as
general welfare, look more at the society as a whole than at the
individual. Robert Nozick accepts a desert theory based on la-
bor,13 while John Rawls' veil of ignorance rejects the idea of de-
sert14 -because no one deserves the ability and talents they are
born with-in favor of a general welfare principle.1 5
Some theorists promulgate a single overarching principle that is
used for all distributions in all situations, while others believe that
no single standard applies to every situation. John Rawls, for ex-
ample, uses his difference principle for all distributions other than
those of basic rights and liberties,1 6 whereas Michael Walzer be-
lieves that different spheres require different criteria, "[a]lthough
what happens in one distributive sphere affects what happens in
the others ... 17
13. See infra notes 29-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of Robert
Nozick's theory.
14. See infra notes 39-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of John Rawls'
theory.
15. See, e.g., GEORGE SCHER, DESERT 22-36 (1987). People do not even deserve
distributions based on effort if effort is conceived of as being genetically determined.
Thus, Rawls' general welfare principle is based on the intrinsic moral worthiness of
each individual, which is by its nature equal for each person.
16. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 75-78 (1971) (explaining the difference
principle) [hereinafter RAWLS, JUSTICE].
17. WALZER, supra, note 4, at 4, 10 ("[T]here has never been a single criterion, or
a single set of interconnected criteria, for all distributions. Desert, qualification, birth
614
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The relationship between taxation and theories of justice is
honored mainly in the breach. Much tax analysis focuses on taxa-
tion as a revenue raising function only: Social norms are taken as a
given (or ignored), and the question is only what is the most effi-
cient way to raise the money. Other theories of tax incorporate an
overarching conception of justice-such as utilitarianism-but fail
to acknowledge, define, or discuss justice adequately. Many tax
theorists either fail to articulate or to explain in detail their under-
lying norms of distributive justice. 18 Conversely, theories of justice
usually pay little attention to taxation, particularly in any detailed
sense. Consequently, general theories of justice and general theo-
ries of taxation often have little connection with reality-with
American perceptions about what is a just distribution of income
and wealth. This Part examines some specific theories of taxation
and general theories of justice as they relate to taxation.
B. Specific Theories of Taxation
There are various theories of taxation including benefits, sacri-
fice, optimal fiscal exchange, ability to pay, and the currently domi-
nant theory of comprehensive income taxation. Each has strengths
and weaknesses; each has received support at various times in
history.
and blood, friendship, need, free exchange, political loyalty, democratic decision:
each has had its place, along with many others, uneasily coexisting, invoked by com-
peting groups, confused with one another."); accord JENNIFER HOCHSCHILD, WHAT'S
FAIR? 106-11 (1981) (explaining that we use principles of differentiation-or
deserts-for the market and principles of equality for the non-market, private or fam-
ily spheres).
18. There are exceptions, of course. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Tax Fairness
or Unfairness? A Consideration of the Philosophical Bases for Unequal Taxation of
Individuals, 12 Am. J. TAX POL'Y 221 (1995); Donna M. Byrne, Progressive Taxation
Revisited, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 739 (1995); Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social
Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV.
1905, 1945-65 (1987) (using welfare theories of distributive justice to support a pro-
gressive but not confiscatory income tax implemented through large cash grants and
flat or even declining marginal rates); Charles R. O'Kelley, Jr., Tax Policy for Post-
Liberal Society: A Flat-Tax-Inspired Redefinition of the Purpose and Ideal Structure of
a Progressive Income Tax, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 727 (1985) (commenting that a flat tax
with a large personal exemption accords with society's individualism tempered by
some communitarianism). Other commentators more briefly connect normative con-
cepts to a particular tax. See, e.g., Griffith, supra note 6, at 1148-55 (discussing briefly
various theories of the ideal tax base); Edward J. McCaffery, Tax Policy Under a Hy-
brid Income-Consumption Tax, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1145, 1172 (1992) (discussing Rawls
in connection with a consumption or expenditure tax). For an early examination of
the philosophic bases of taxation, see generally WESTON, supra note 6.
19961 615
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The benefits theory of taxation holds that people should pay tax
in proportion to the amount of benefits they receive from the gov-
ernment. This theory is difficult to apply because it is difficult to
determine the exact amount of benefits each person receives.
Some theorists argue that wealthier individuals receive more bene-
fits primarily because they have more property to protect; others
argue that poorer people receive the lion's share of benefits be-
cause they receive valuable goods and services that they would not
otherwise receive. In contrast, some believe that all people receive
equal benefits because the major governmental benefit is protec-
tion of the person. According to John Stuart Mill, failure to pro-
vide equal benefits is a sign of a major societal flaw.19
The benefits theory was basically abandoned by the end of the
nineteenth century.20 It has been revived, however, by fiscal ex-
change theorists who emphasize liberty: The "tax system should
resemble a voluntary exchange economy in which prices reflect
consumer[s'] willingness to pay .... "21 By treating the tax system
like the market economy, this theory limits the size of government.
Sacrifice theories of taxation, based on utilitarianism, attempt to
maximize aggregate happiness or utility, using income as the mea-
sure of utility.22 There are three major types of sacrifice: equal,
proportional, and minimal. Equal sacrifice requires each taxpayer
19. Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxa-
tion, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417, 455 (1952) (quoting 2 JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES
OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 806 (Ashley's ed. 1923)). See also Marjorie E. Kornhauser,
The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement. A Typical Male Reac-
tion, 86 MICH. L. REV. 465, 491-97 (1987) (the wealthy may receive greater benefits
from government than the poor).
As to benefits taxation, Richard Epstein states that "[t]o insist that classic public
(non-divisible, non-exclusive) goods provide equal subjective benefits, much less ben-
efits that exceed tax payments, is entirely inconsistent with our (indeed any) system of
organized government." RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 295 (1985). What is relevant for determining the just-
ness of the tax, he says, is whether the "tax produces a disproportionate impact and
whether it enlarges the overall pie." Id. A proper tax structure seeks to minimize the
discrepancy between tax costs and benefits. Id. at 298-99.
20. See John F. Witte, Tax Philosophy and Income Equality, in VALUE JUDGMENT
AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION 340, 350 (Robert A. Solo & Charles W. Anderson eds.,
1981); see generally EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, ESSAYS IN TAXATION (10th ed., 1925).
21. James A. Dorn, Introduction-The Principles and Politics of Tax Reform, 5
CATO J. 361, 366 (1985). See also Walter Hettich & Stanley Winer, Blueprints and
Pathways: The Shifting Foundations of Tax Reform, 38 NAT'L TAX J. 423, 432 (1985).
22. As John Witte has said, "Since taxation considered apart from benefits consti-
tutes lost utility, utilitarian-based theories are expressed in terms of sacrifice." Witte,
supra note 20, at 350. This portion of this Article relies heavily on Witte's excellent
summary of utilitarian and ability to pay theories, id., and on a similar summary found
in Blum & Kalven, supra note 19, at 455-486.
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to pay tax in an amount such that each loses the same amount of
utility. Thus, if before taxes, A had six utiles and B had two, the
tax would consume the same amount from each, say one utile, leav-
ing A, after-tax, with five utiles and B one. Proportional sacrifice
requires that the after-tax ratio of utility equal the pre-tax ratio.
Under proportional sacrifice, in the above situation the pre-tax ra-
tio of 3:1 would remain the same after taxes. Minimal sacrifice re-
quires that the tax minimize the aggregate amount of sacrifice by
society. Thus, assuming the marginal utility of money declines,
those with more money will always pay more in absolute dollars
than those with less money. Minimum sacrifice theory, followed to
its logical extreme, leads to the leveling of incomes, a result at
odds, as will be shown, with the concept of liberty, many theoreti-
cal concepts of equality, and the popular tradition.
The difficulty, if not impossibility, of making interpersonal com-
parisons of utility creates well-known problems for utilitarian prin-
ciples. For example, even if we agree that the utility of money
declines, we do not know the rate at which it declines. Conse-
quently, it is impossible to determine equal and proportional sacri-
fice. The uncertainty of the rate of decline is immaterial for
minimum sacrifice since any rate of decline requires that those with
larger incomes pay the tax until incomes have equalized.23
Optimal taxation, a recent theory, is also based on utilitarianism,
but in a more complicated way than sacrifice theories. Through a
complex methodology it takes into account the disincentive to
work caused by taxation, and accommodates some welfarist con-
cerns about guaranteed or minimum incomes. 24 Through economic
23. No matter what the rate, so long as marginal utility always declines, the loss of
a dollar to a person with more income (say $20,000) will be less than the loss of a
dollar to one with less income ($10,000). While minimum sacrifice avoids the prob-
lem of discerning the precise rate of decline, it does not avoid the problem of defining
the exact nature of utility and then determining its relationship to money.
24. See Witte, supra note 20, at 363-68, for a summary of optimal taxation; see also
Bankman & Griffith, supra note 18, at 1950-65.
The disincentive to work arises from the substitution effect of a tax increase. Any
tax has two conflicting effects: a substitution effect and an income effect. When taxes
rise, a taxpayer will substitute leisure for work because she gets to keep less of her
income than before the tax increase. On the other hand, under the income effect a
taxpayer needs to increase her work when taxes rise to maintain her standard of liv-
ing; without increased work, take-home pay will decrease. It is generally believed
that secondary earners are more subject to the substitution effect-and thus more
likely to have a disincentive to work in the face of taxes-than primary workers. See,
e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gen-
der Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983, 1038-39 (1993). To the extent that
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modeling, the theory attempts to determine an ideal tax that will
maximize both tax and welfare.
The faculty theory of taxation holds that taxation should be
based on one's ability to pay. The exact meaning of the "ability to
pay" concept has varied over its long history.25 In earlier times
when most wealth was held in the form of real or personal prop-
erty, property provided an appropriate measure of the ability to
pay. In an industrialized society, however, income became a more
appropriate measure of ability because wealth was held in intangi-
ble as well as tangible forms. Using income to calculate "ability to
pay," however, presents several problems.
The first problem concerns the marginal utility of money.
Although most people agree that marginal utility declines, there is
disagreement as to how fast it declines. Differing curves argue for
differing tax rates. For example, a steep decline has been used to
justify a graduated or progressive tax rate rather than a proportion-
ate or flat rate. However, as with the sacrifice theory, the impossi-
bility of determining the exact rate of decline creates the same
problem of uncertainty. Even if the rate of decline were ascertain-
able, there would still be a problem. We would need to know
something about the needs of A and B before we could determine
their ability to pay. If A had a spouse and three children to sup-
port and B had no dependents, then how much greater would be
A's ability to pay than B's? Even if A and B both had no depen-
dents, would A's ability to pay be greater than B's if A were earn-
ing the maximum per hour that the market will pay given her
abilities but B had the education and skills to earn $200,000 as a
heart surgeon but had chosen a less stressful job that pays only
$50,000 (or chose to work part-time so she could wind surf)? What
if A's income were earned through her labors, but B's were all in-
vestment income and she sat and ate bonbons all day?
people work for non-monetary reasons such as prestige, self-esteem, and interest, a
tax produces no work disincentive.
25. For a history of the theory, see, e.g., SELIGMAN, supra note 20; Alfred G.
Buehler, Ability to Pay, 1 TAX L. REV. 243 (1946). The first of Adam Smith's four
maxims of taxation-equality, certainty, administrability, and efficiency-states:
The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the
government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities;
that is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the
protection of the state.
2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 825 (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner eds., Liberty Classics, 1981) (1776)
(Book V, Ch. II, Part II).
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Some theorists believe the best measure of ability to pay is not
income but expenditures or consumption, because basing ability to
pay on income ignores assets beyond income.26 Compare A, who
has $50,000 of accumulated wealth and annually earns and spends
$50,000, with B, who spends $100,000 and owns property worth $1
million which earns $50,000 income. Because basing ability to pay
on income ignores the extra assets that B has, many people advo-
cate a consumption tax. However, if A spends $100,000 (dipping
into all her savings) and B spends only her $50,000 investment in-
come, is A's ability to pay higher than B's? Clearly, at a minimum,
ability to pay cannot be determined on a yearly basis.
The current dominant basis of taxation, the comprehensive in-
come tax, avoids many of the difficulties of the previous theories by
adopting a more practical approach. The comprehensive tax is
concerned with two types of equality: vertical and horizontal. Ver-
tical equality ("vertical equity") is based on the idea of ability to
pay. It holds that those with a greater income should pay a greater
amount of tax. Horizontal equality ("horizontal equity") says that
those with equal amounts of income should pay equal amounts of
tax. Income is determined under the Haig-Simons all-inclusive
definition of income as the the sum of "the market value of rights
exercised in consumption and ... the change in the value of the
store of property rights between the beginning and end of the pe-
riod in question. ' 27 A uniform tax rate is then applied to all in-
come regardless of its source. Thus, all income is taxed equally, be
it earned, unearned, in-kind, cash, or-theoretically-imputed in-
come such as that from owner-occupied homes and owner-pro-
vided services. The result of this uniform treatment is, or should
be, horizontal equity.
Of course the equity issue is not resolved so easily because it is
difficult to determine when two taxpayers are in like situations.
Consider, for example, A and B, each earning $50,000. Are they
equal if: (i) A is healthy and B is chronically ill and requires con-
stant expensive medical treatment? (ii) A has three dependents
26. See, e.g., 2 JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 317 (The
Colonial Press 1899)(Bk. V, Ch. II); IRVING FISHER & HERBERT W. FISHER, CON-
STRUCTIVE INCOME TAXATION (1942); NICHOLAS KALDOR, AN EXPENDITURE TAX
31 (1958). Modem supporters of a consumption tax also advocate it on both ability to
pay grounds and efficiency grounds. See, e.g., William D. Andrews, A Consumption-
Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1165-77 (1974)
(discussing fairness and efficiency arguments for a consumption-type personal income
tax).
27. HENRY SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938).
1996] 619
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIII
and B none? (iii) A's house burns to the ground? (iv) A earns her
income via personal labor and B receives it as investment income?
(v) B prefers to eat steak and wear designer clothing while A eats
hamburger and shops at a generic brand discount store? Tradition-
ally, the tax code has considered the first three situations unequal
and consequently has allowed deductions for them. Income in the
fourth situation frequently has been treated differently whereas in-
come in the fifth has not. Once the tax code starts making distinc-
tions between equal amounts of income, the requirement that
income from all sources be treated equally becomes meaningless. 8
C. General Theories of Justice
General theories of justice, by virtue of their generality, affect all
aspects of society. Consequently these theories create-in broad
strokes at least-the framework of a just tax system. The vague-
ness of most theories' tax framework means that often one general
theory can suggest more than one tax system. Utilitarianism, for
example, as discussed in the prior section, supports the sacrifice
theory of taxation with all its variations and difficulties. Moreover,
utilitarianism also is involved in the ability to pay and optimal tax
theories. This section briefly examines two general theories of jus-
tice and their implications for taxation: Robert Nozick's liberta-
rian theory, and John Rawls' maximin or difference principle.
1. Robert Nozick's Theory
Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia exemplifies the con-
servative libertarian philosophy which underlies the fiscal exchange
theory of tax.2 9 Nozick's theory of justice is procedural, emphasiz-
ing freedom or liberty. His stress on procedure justifies unequal
distributions: An unequal distribution is just if the method which
produces it is just.
Nozick's premise is a Lockean conception of entitlement, but
with a very important modification. According to Locke, the rights
of the individual precede the state, whose function is to provide
such services as are necessary (such as protection of person and
28. The various theories of taxation described above are based on differing con-
ceptions of fairness. Some emphasize liberty, others equality. Both concepts have
varied meanings which are examined in Part II, infra.
29. ROBERT NoziCK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974). See also EPSTEIN,
supra note 19, at 5-6 (private property and personal liberty exist prior to the state and
it is the state's function to protect them). For another view of property which differ-
entiates between fungible property and property connected to a person's sense of
identity, see MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 11-18 (1993).
620
FAIR INCOME TAX
property) to enable the individual to flourish. The individual has a
natural right to his body and, as a consequence, has a natural right
to the fruits of his labor and to any property with which he has
commingled his labor. This entitlement is limited by Locke's pro-
viso that a person may appropriate property only if his appropria-
tion does not disadvantage another. In other words, I may
appropriate some of good X only so long as enough X is left for
others.
In today's world of scarcity, the proviso not to disadvantage
others would prevent the appropriation of most property. Nozick
avoided this problem of scarcity by modifying the proviso to state
that a person may appropriate X even if no more X is available to
others so long as others can still improve their situations in other
ways. 30 "The crucial point," according to Nozick, "is whether ap-
propriation of an unowned object worsens the situation of
others."' 3' In short, Nozick's interpretation of the Lockean proviso
supports economic efficiency principles or at least wealth enhance-
ment, if not wealth maximization.32
30. NOZICK, supra note 29, at 175. But see JOHN L. MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING
RIGHT AND WRONG 174-78 (1977) (concluding that although there should be laws
governing the ownership of property, there is no "natural" property law); John
Christman, Can Ownership Be Justified By Natural Rights? 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 156,
174-75 (1986) (answering the question posed by the title in the negative).
31. NozICK, supra note 29, at 175. Even if all property is appropriated, Nozick
suggests that the system is legitimate if others are not worse off than they would be in
a state of nature. Id. at 177. Henry Sidgwick stated that private property based on
one's labors is permissible even though it diminishes another's opportunities because
this inevitable diminution of opportunities is adequately compensated;...
the appropriation by first comers of the 'spontaneous gifts of nature' [land]
is not substantially unfair to those who come after, because though they find
the land and its produce appropriated, they are placed in a better position
than they would be in if there had been no appropriation.
HENRY SIDGWICK, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 502 (3d ed. 1901).
32. Thus, as Geoffrey Miller states, the Lockean proviso as revised by Nozick re-
sembles the concept of economic efficiency. He restates the proviso as follows:
It is permissible under the law of nature to acquire unowned property by
mixing one's labor with it, so long as the value of the property that one has
taken in excess of one's pro rata share is less than or equal to the benefits to
others that flow from the appropriation ....
Geoffrey Miller, Comment: Economic Efficiency and The Lockean Proviso, 10 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 401, 410 (1987). Richard Epstein also uses efficiency arguments to
support private property. See, e.g., EPSTEIN supra note 19, at 3-5. There are different
definitions of "efficiency." Under Pareto efficiency no person can be made better off
without someone else being made worse off. Kaldor-Hicks, or potential Pareto effi-
ciency, states that a transaction is efficient if there are in the aggregate more gains
than losses. Wealth is maximized because the winners could compensate the losers so
that no one would be worse off. While Pareto efficiency requires an actual voluntary
exchange, the Kaldor-Hicks definition does not. The Nozickean version of the Lock-
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The Nozickean theory, based on an entitlement to private prop-
erty as a prerequisite for liberty and human flourishing, mandates
a free-market system. Since the right to property includes the
rights to use, possess, and dispose of the-property,33 freedom of
contract is necessary. Under Nozick's theory the state has a claim
on a person's goods only in two instances. First, the individual
must pay his share of the expenses of providing a minimal state.
Second, through a principle of rectification, the state may remove
property from an individual who has obtained it improperly-such
as through theft. If a person has rightfully obtained his property,
the state may not appropriate one person's property to help an-
other-taxation to redistribute wealth, therefore, is blatantly
wrong.34
While Nozick recognizes that the lack of equality of opportunity
may seem both unfair and unfortunate, he generally opposes
equality of opportunity because it interferes with liberty and legiti-
mate property entitlements:
The major objection to speaking of everyone's having, a right to
various things such as equality of opportunity, life, and so on,
and enforcing this right, is that these "rights" require a substruc-
ture of things and materials and actions; and other people may
have rights and entitlements over these.35
Nozick's system of entitlement argues for taxation at a flat, low
rate. Because of its focus on individual rights, logically this theory
supports a limited view of government, and therefore a minimal
amount of tax.36 Moreover, redistribution is a prohibited tax func-
tion because it contradicts this entitlement theory.
ean Proviso implements Pareto superiority, not Pareto optimality: It may be true that
my appropriation of an object, X, will not make you worse off. Thus, my appropria-
tion is Pareto superior to neither one of us appropriating X. However, my appropria-
tion may not be Pareto optimal (and therefore efficient) since your possession of X
might be more socially useful than mine.
33. See EPSTEIN, supra note 19, at 58-59. See also RADIN, supra note 29, at 121-22,.
and infra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
34. Nozick even went so far as to state that "taxation of earnings from labor is on
a par with forced labor." NOZiCK, supra note 29, at 169. He did comment, however,
that he was unclear as to whether such taxation equaled forced labor or was merely
similar to it. Id. at 169 n.*.
35. Id. at 238 (emphasis in the original).
36. It is theoretically possible that people who believe in the entitlement theory
also believe in many governmental functions. Cf. EPSTEIN, supra note 19, at 99-100 (a
tax is a taking and therefore subject to the eminent domain clause; legitimacy of tax
therefore rests on "[t]he justifications available for all other forms of taking: police
power, consent, and compensation.. ."). Epstein believes that although a direct cor-
relation between governmental benefits and tax burdens is impossible, a flat tax is
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Nozick recently softened the absolutism of his entitlement the-
ory by suggesting that a limited inheritance tax may be justified.
Such a tax would allow a person to bequeath whatever wealth she
had earned but none of the wealth she had inherited herself.3
7
Nozick's concession in the inheritance area implies a recognition of
the limits of his theory. It also exposes a fundamental weakness:
under his theory, entitlement ultimately rests on the acquisition of
property through labor. Once he admits that entitlements to inher-
ited property may be limited because it is unearned, other types of
non-earned, legitimately-held property are open for redistribution
purposes-such as lottery winnings.
If the legitimacy of redistribution depends on whether income is
earned, the definition of "earned" becomes crucial. For example,
does it depend on the amount of time, effort, quality, or other fac-
tor one puts into work, or is it simply market driven? If earned
income is based on individual criteria such as effort, one must dif-
ferentiate between those criteria and luck. When businessman A
"earns" $100,000 a year and B "earns" only $75,000, is the differ-
ence due to individual merit or luck? Some studies suggest that
very frequently the disparity in income is due to luck.38
2. Rawls' Theory of Justice
The touchstone of modem general theories of justice is John
Rawls' Theory of Justice.39 Under his conception of justice as fair-
ness, starting from its "original position" behind a veil of igno-
rance, there are two principles of justice:
a. Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme
of equal basic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible
with the same scheme for all; and in this scheme the equal polit-
ical liberties, and only those liberties, are to be guaranteed their
fair value.
better than a progressive one because it minimizes the discrepancy between the two.
Id. at 298. Furthermore, progressive taxation increases the chance of an impermissi-
ble taking. Id. at 299.
37. ROBERT NozICK, THE EXAMINED LIFE: PHILOSOPHICAL MEDITATIONS 30-31
(1989). But see EPSTEIN, supra note 19, at 303-05 (progressive transfer taxes are im-
permissible takings); Elliott M. Abramson, Philosophization Against Taxation: Why
Nozick's Challenge Fails, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 753 (1981) (general critique of Nozick with
respect to taxation).
38. See Gian Singh Sahota, Theories of Personal Income Distribution: A Survey,
16 J. EcON. LIT. 1, 7-9 (1978) (tracing the development of stochastic theory).
39. RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 16. For a more recent elaboration in which Rawls
places his theory more overtly in a political context, see RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra
note 4, at 289-371 (concerning basic liberties and their priority).
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b. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two condi-
tions: first, they are to be attached to positions and offices open
to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and sec-
ond, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least ad-
vantaged members of society [the maximin or difference
principle] .40
According to these two principles, Rawls states: "All social pri-
mary goods-liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the
bases of self-respect-are to be distributed equally unless an une-
qual distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage of
the least favored."' 41 The Rawlsean difference principle permits
fairly earned inequality of incomes because aiding the least favored
requires significant, long-term capital accumulation.42 Some capi-
tal accumulation raises the standard of living for current and suc-
ceeding generations, and therefore justifies income inequality to
the extent necessary to bring "about the full realization of just in-
stitutions and the fair value of liberty.
43
40. RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 4, at 5-6. Rawls writes that "the equal basic
liberties in the first principle of justice are specified by a list as follows: freedom of
thought and liberty of conscience; the political liberties and freedom of association, as
well as the freedoms specified by the liberty and integrity of the person; and finally,
the rights and liberties covered by the rule of law." Id. at 291. Such basic liberties can
be limited or denied only when two liberties conflict, not simply to improve economic
growth and efficiency or to help the least well-off. Id. at 294-95.
The veil of ignorance is a figurative limitation on information whereby parties to a
discourse are allowed to know neither the social position of those whom they repre-
sent, nor the comprehensive doctrine of such persons. Id. at 24-25. The concept has
also been used-prior to its use by Rawls-to support utilitarianism; for example, be-
cause a person would not know how well-off she would be, she would rationally
choose a system which maximizes total utility, because it maximizes the average
amount of her expected return. Louis Kaplow, A Fundamental Objection to Tax Eq-
uity Norms: A Call for Utilitarianism, 48 NAT'L TAX J. 497, 502-03 (1995). This, of
course, assumes that people are risk neutral. Kaplow, in defending a utilitarianism
norm against an equitable norm, says that an equitable norm should not hinge on
individual preferences. Id. at 500.
41. RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 303.
42. Id. at 285.
43. Id. at 290. Accumulation beyond that, says Rawls, is "more likely to be a
positive hindrance, a meaningless distraction at best if not a temptation to indulgence
and emptiness." Id. Incomes and wages are fairly earned or "just once a (workably)
competitive price system is properly organized and embedded in a just basic struc-
ture." Id. at 304.
In his justification of capital accumulation as necessary to general progress for all
society, Rawls is reminiscent of Andrew Carnegie. See, e.g., ANDREW CARNEGIE,
Popular Illusions About Trusts, 60 CENTURY MAGAZINE 143 (May 1900), reprinted in
THE GOSPEL OF WEALTH AND OTHER TIMELY ESSAYS 78, 81-83 (Edward C. Kirk-
land ed., 1965).
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Under Rawls' theory, the role of taxation is to maintain a just
distribution of income in two respects. First, taxation has a non-
revenue raising function: "gradually and continually to correct the
distribution of wealth and to prevent concentrations of power det-
rimental to the fair value of political liberty and fair equality of
opportunity."'44 Since unequal inheritances endanger both political
liberty and equal opportunity, inheritance taxes are appropriate.a
Rawls notes that unequal inheritance of wealth is "no more inher-
ently unjust than the unequal inheritance of intelligence. '46 What
is important for both is that any or either inequality meet his differ-
ence principle: the inequality is allowable if it helps the least well-
off and does not encroach upon liberty and opportunity.4 7 Inher-
ited wealth must be redistributed because inheritance restricts lib-
erty by creating centers of power that devalue representative
government and restrict opportunity by limiting access to equal ed-
ucation and cultural growth.
The second function of taxation is to raise revenue to pay for
necessary public goods and transfer payments to the least well-off
in a just manner. Rawls has little to say about this function. He
merely suggests that a flat or proportional expenditure tax
may be part of the best tax scheme .... [A flat tax] is preferable
to an income tax of any kind at the level of common sense
precepts of justice, since it imposes a levy according to how
much a person takes out of the common store of goods and not
according to how much he contributes (assuming here that in-
come is fairly earned).48
Rawls' support of an expenditure tax is flawed because he ig-
nores how a person controls and gets advantages from funds that
he owns but does not consume. In addition to the unfair social and
political power one obtains through ownership of earned wealth, 9
a person's investment decisions may yield more personal gains than
44. RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 277. Very little has been written on the
application of Rawls' theory to tax. Examples include Byrne, supra note 19, at 774-
78, and Charles R. O'Kelley, Jr., Rawls, Justice, and the Income Tax, 16 GA. L. REV. 1
(1981).
45. The exact limits of such a tax are a political issue-not one for a theory of





49. Ownership of earned wealth poses the same threat to liberty and opportunity
as inherited wealth. See infra notes 86-91 and accompanying text for discussion of the
threats posed by inherited wealth.
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gains for the common good. Rawls assumes that economic growth
(a product of the investments) will further the common good. This
is not necessarily so-the rich can get richer while the poor get
poorer.
Finally, although Rawls recognizes that a progressive rate may
be necessary to maintain liberty and opportunity,5° he relegates the
issue of the exact character of the progression to the political
arena. However, the rates may have to be so high to accommodate
the minimum welfare of the least well-off that such a tax is totally
impracticable. Unlike Nozick, Rawls thus believes that because a
just tax considers the pre-tax distribution, redistribution is a valid
tax function.
Rawls recognizes that his ideal methods of taxation are applica-
ble only in an ideal world. In an existing world with unjust institu-
tions and conditions, he accepts that even a highly progressive
income tax may be justified.51 Rawls, by his own admission, offers
no advice regarding the most just tax for twentieth century
America because even those who think the system is generally
fair-or the fairest in existence-would admit presumably that
America is not a perfectly just society.
II. American Political Tradition, Distributive Justice, and A
Fair Income Tax
As the survey of theories in Part I indicates, there is no single
principle of distributive justice upon which all theorists agree.
However, common norms of distribution include:
1. equal lots (per capita);





7. requirements of common good (general welfare);
8. ascription (characteristics such as age, physical condition,
sex, race); and
50. RAwLs, JusTIcE, supra note 16, at 278-79.
51. Id. at 279 ("In practice, we must usually choose between several unjust, or
second best, arrangements; and then we look to nonideal theory to find the least un-
just scheme."). Rawls is not particularly concerned with taxation since it generally is
not involved in issues regarding basic rights and political liberties. See RAwLS, LIBER-
ALISM, supra note 4, at 214.
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9. luck.52
Different formal theories of justice emphasize different norms.
Rawls, for example, focused on general welfare requirements while
Nozick emphasized investment inputs and personal merit factors,
such as ability. To varying extents the American public accepts all
of these norms as morally just; nevertheless, we do not evaluate all
situations by the same one. For example, distribution according to
need-the classic Marxist criterion 53-occurs in the public sphere
in the form of general welfare programs such as those that help the
poor. Distribution according to effort is a common criterion in the
home and to some extent in school, but not in the market.54 A
common distributive norm in the market is supply and demand: A
person "deserves" to get the market price-that price another is
willing to pay for the proffered good or service. Even ascriptive
criteria such as race, age, and gender, that are generally invalid,
have validity in limited situations such as in social security or other
age-based retirement programs.56
52. See, e.g., HOCHSCHILD, supra note 17, at 47-82 (analyzing six "norms of distrib-
utive justice"); SCHER, supra note 15, at 6-7 (listing fifteen "desert bases"); Morton
Deutsch, Equity, Equality, and Need: What Determines Which Value Will Be Used as
the Basis of Distributive Justice?, 31 J. Soc. ISSUES 137, 139 (1975) (listing eleven "key
values" which underlie distributive justice). Ronald Dworkin supports an equality of
resources, not general welfare. See generally Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part
3: The Place of Liberty, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1987).
53. Walzer rightly notes that the first part of the Marxist credo-"from each ac-
cording to his ability"-is also a distributive principle which at times conflicts with the
second half of his credo of distributing according to needs. WALZER, supra note 4, at
25.
54. See, e.g., KEITH JOSEPH & JONATHAN SUMPTION, EQUALITY 71-72 (1979).
They state that rewarding the effort of the producer occurs at the "direct expense of
the consumer, and since the consumer's money is the product of his own work, the
rewards of his effort are correspondingly reduced." Therefore, distribution by effort
in the market can occur only if one part of the population subsidizes the other.
55. Walzer, however, states that to conceive of price as "desert" because it reflects
the value of the goods or services to others "is to misunderstand the meaning of de-
sert. Unless there are standards of worth independent of what people want (and are
willing to buy)... there can be no deservingness at all. We would never know what a
person deserved until we saw what he had gotten." WALZER, supra note 4, at 108.
Walzer, nevertheless, accepts the fairness of market distribution as long as it is lim-
ited to the commercial sphere only: "The morality of the bazaar belongs in the ba-
zaar. The market is a zone of the city, not the whole of the city." Id. at 109. Cf.
Heather Milne, Desert, Effort and Equality, 3 J. APP. PHIL. 235 (1986). There is a
difference, Milne says, between merit and desert. One may merit something based on
natural ability or attributes but "a person cannot be deserving of praise or reward
without trying." Id. at 240.
56. Race- and gender-based affirmative action programs raise the issue of whether
race and gender are ever valid criteria or whether the law always must be color- and
sex-blind. Critical Race Theory in fact states that race does and should matter in all
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Distribution criteria generally fit within one of two basic princi-
ples: the principle of equality or the principle of differentiation.
The criteria of equal lots and needs, for example, fit the former and
the criteria of ability and effort fit the latter. In general, distribu-
tions based on equality will contradict distributions based on differ-
entiation that stress liberty. The two, however, can produce the
same result if the method of differentiation (investment, for exam-
ple) is based on a factor held equally by all.
Commentators have noted that people generally use the princi-
ple of equality in their family lives, but they use the principle of
differentiation in the economic sphere.57 Therefore, for example,
the uneven distribution of an inheritance between siblings seems
unjust, whereas an unequal distribution based on earnings does
not. Even within the economic sphere, however, we do not use
only a principle of differentiation. For example, people's judg-
ments will differ about a distribution of $50,000 income to A and
$1 million to B according to whether the income is the result of
personal labor, a gift, a passive investment, or luck. Even within
one sphere we often evaluate an allocation of goods according to
several criteria of a particular principle. 58 Some factors, such as
investment, ability, and effort, carry more weight than others.
Americans frequently concentrate on desert norms (broadly de-
fined as contribution-be it ability, effort, or performance) as well
as on need and strict equality.59
We use this mixture of principles and criteria (and in which situa-
tions) because they are connected to the twin foundations of our
nation, equality and liberty,60 which in turn are connected to our
aspects of the law. Barbara Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See": White Race Con-
sciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 955-
56 (1993). For a survey of Critical Race Theory articles, see Richard Delgado & Jean
Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography, 79 VA. L. REV. 461
(1993).
57. HoCHSCHILD, supra note 17, at 47-48.
58. See, e.g., id. at 106-11. Beliefs about justice thus are "pluralistic" in the strong
sense that more than one criterion is used in a single situation as well as in the weaker
sense of there being one different principle for each different domain. See David
Miller, Distributive Justice: What the People Think, 102 ETHICS 555, 558-59 (1992).
59. See Miller, supra note 58, at 569.
60. Alexis de Tocqueville, early in our history, declared equality to be our "princi-
ple [sic] passion," 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 504
(George Lawrence trans., Doubleday, 1969) (1835), quoted in William Kristol, Lib-
erty, Equality, Honor, in LIBERTY AND EQUALITY 125, 136 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al.
eds., 1985), but others see liberty as the dominant force. While some see the two
principles as compatible, others view them as in conflict. See, e.g., Werner J. Dan-
nhauser, Democracy in America, in LIBERTY AND EQUALITY 141, 156-57 (Ellen Fran-
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sense of morality, which I have labeled moral economic individual-
ism. This Part examines distributive justice in the context of the
American political experience. First it surveys various concepts of
liberty and equality. Next it describes our tradition of moral eco-
nomic individualism which gives special force to conceptions of lib-
erty and equality.
A. Liberty
The Declaration of Independence proclaims that we have an
"unalienable" right to liberty. Although liberty has many mean-
ings, the most common, traditional meaning in America is freedom
from coercion. 61 Liberty in this popular sense is a negative liberty
because it means freedom from intentional restraints (or coercion)
by others-exemplified by our constitutional rights to freedom of
speech and assembly, and .protection against warrantless searches.
Negative liberty is inextricably connected to private property,
the free market, and principles of economic efficiency. Because
negative liberty requires that a person be able to use his body, and
by extension that property over which he gains control, free from
the constraints of others, it requires a system of private property
which assigns complete (or almost complete) ownership to individ-
uals. Without such individual ownership, a person's use and enjoy-
ment of property would be contingent on another's will.62
Moreover, private property is the most efficient way of assuring the
fullest development of the self-the goal of liberty-because the
individual can best determine his own interests.
kel Paul et al. eds., 1985). The confusion as to how these principles relate to one
another stems from the fact that each principle has many different conceptions.
61. See, e.g., R.M. Hare, Liberty and Equality: How Politics Masquerades as Phi-
losophy, in LIBERTY AND EQUALITY 1, 1 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1985). Isaiah
Berlin states that there are over 200 conceptions of liberty, but he deals only with the
two most used: positive and negative liberty or freedom. ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Con-
cepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 121 (1969). The dominance of
negative liberty has recently been critically scrutinized in the legal field. See, e.g.,
Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271, 2342
(1990) (critiquing "conventional wisdom" of a constitution based on negative liberty
as being based on "questionable" and "anachronistic" assumptions).
62. See, e.g., Jan Narveson, Equality vs. Liberty: Advantage, Liberty, in LIBERTY
AND EQUALITY 33, 55-56 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1985). But see RADIN, supra
note 29, at 53-55 (certain property is so personal that it should be treated differently
from fungible property, which is property with which the individual has a less per-
sonal involvement).
The right to private property also has a moral basis that emanates from the Protes-
tant Ethic tradition. See infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
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Private property and the liberty to pursue one's own interest also
increases others' ability to flourish. When individuals pursue their
self-interest, they stimulate economic development, causing the
proverbial pie to grow (the expanding pie theory), giving everyone
a bigger slice. Thus, according to this view of liberty, the free mar-
ket system is not only the best system to maximize liberty, but it is
the most efficient way to maximize benefits. 63 Despite recent sta-
tistics that undermine the expanding pie theory, libertarians still
can justify a free- market, private property system on the grounds
of wealth maximization: Since winners' gains exceed the losers'
losses (and the winners could hypothetically compensate the
losers), society remains better off.64
Negative liberty conflicts with most meanings of equality. For
example, allowing individuals with varying degrees of talent, skills,
needs, desires, and effort to pursue their self-interests inevitably
will create inequalities of wealth, income, and satisfaction. Never-
theless, negative liberty is founded on a type of equality-equality
of respect or concern for each individual's right to liberty. Equality
of respect supports political equality-each individual has equal
rights to negative liberty vis-A-vis the government and other indi-
viduals. This political equality is contained in many of our consti-
tutional rights such as the right to vote, to speak freely, and to
travel.
Liberty also has a positive aspect which leads more directly to-
wards equality. Positive liberty is a freedom
to be [one's] own master, . . . to be the instrument of [one's]
own, not of other men's, acts of will.., to be a subject, not an
object; to be moved by reason, by conscious purposes, which are
[one's] own.... to be ... a doer-deciding, not being decided
for, self-directed and not acted upon by external nature or by
63. The natural effort of every individual to better his own condition, when
suffered to exert itself with freedom and security, is so powerful a principle,
that it is alone, and without any assistance, not only capable of carrying on
the society to wealth and prosperity, but of surmounting a hundred imperti-
nent obstructions with which the folly of human laws too often encumbers its
operations.
1 SMITH, supra note 25, at 540 (Book IV, Ch. V, Part II). Robert Nozick's entitlement
theory turns Locke's theory of property into an economic efficiency principle. See
supra text and notes immediately following note 31.
64. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 90-91 (1981). The
widening gap in income equality in the 1980s and 90s has raised economists' fears,
however, that the income gap hurts growth. See, e.g., Editorial, Attack the Income
Gap at Its Source, BUSINESS WEEK, Aug. 15, 1994, at 76.
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other men as if [one] were a thing, or an animal, or a slave inca-
pable of playing a human role.65
According to Isaiah Berlin, positive liberty answers the question
"By whom am I governed?" while negative liberty answers "How
much am I governed? '66 Other theorists define positive liberty as
ensuring that the individual has what she needs in order to exercise
her liberty.67 Positive liberty holds that it is meaningless to say that
A has the liberty of living wherever he pleases when he does not
have the financial resources to purchase any home or if no one will
sell to him. Certain requirements are so basic that even the exer-
cise of negative liberty is meaningless without them. It is not
enough to be free to do what you wish if you are too ignorant,
hungry, or cold to do anything but struggle for survival.
In short, positive liberty states that people have no liberty unless
they have a minimum of material goods which permit them ration-
ally to conceive goals and the opportunities to achieve them; mere
struggle for survival is not liberty. Under positive liberty, people
have a right to some private property since it is necessary for their
moral development and for real autonomy.68 Berlin would call
these provisions of goods and choices pre-conditions of liberty
rather than positive liberty.69 Thus, even negative liberty points
towards a leveling of inequality to the extent that goods must be
redistributed from the better-off to the worse-off to ensure that the
latter have enough to enable them to be independent actors and
that opportunities be available for all to achieve their goals.
Negative liberty, says Berlin, is "a function of what doors, and
how many, are open to [the individual].... 70 In this sense it is
65. BERLIN, supra note 61, at 131.
66. ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY xliii (1969).
67. Narveson, supra note 62, at 51. Accord James M. Buchanan & Loren E.
Lomasky, The Matrix of Contractarian Justice, in LIBERTY AND EQUALITY 12, 17 n.8
(Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1985) ("Proponents of a conception of positive liberty
maintain that person P has the liberty to do x if and only if no one or no social institu-
tion constrains P from doing x, and if it is the case that P has the ability to do x (i.e.,
does not lack the means necessary for doing x).").
68. Jeremy Waldron states that this view that property is a right of man is found in
philosophical papers, not in political constitutions, because it would be "very radical"
in its requirement that private property not just exist, but be 'held by every person.
JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT To PRIVATE PROPERTY 23-24 (1988). Thomas Jef-
ferson, in fact, proposed in 1776 that Virginia distribute fifty acres of land to every
man who did not already own that many. GORDON WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 179 (1991).
69. BERLIN, supra note 66, at liii.
70. Id. at xlviii.
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related to equality of opportunity.7 Positive and negative liberty
thus have some common goals, but they also conflict: to increase
the positive liberty of the many may restrict the negative liberty of
others. Ensuring universal health care, for example, may require
restricting others' health care options.
While positive and negative liberty do overlap, their extremes
point in opposite directions. Negative liberty validates a principle
of differentiation which justifies unequal results or outcomes. Car-
ried to the extreme, however, negative liberty can deny liberty to
some people because they lack the political or economic resources
to exercise that liberty. Positive liberty permits more equality of
access to resources and opportunities, but often at a cost of nega-
tive liberty. Each supports "equality," but their definitions of
equality differ.
B. Equality
Equality, like liberty, is fundamental to the United States.
Before proclaiming the inalienable right to liberty, the Declaration
of Independence asserts that "All men [sic] are created equal." In-
deed, the "radicalism" of the American Revolution, according to
Gordon Wood, lies in the revolution's abolition of a system of priv-
ilege, hierarchy, and patronage and the establishment of a political
(and social) system based on equally free and independent men.72
Whether the principles of equality and liberty conflict depends, in
part, on the definition given to each term. Since both principles
are foundations of our country, the best definitions, it would seem,
would be ones that are compatible with each other.73
Equality has a multitude of meanings including equality of op-
portunity, of results, of resources, of needs satisfaction, of utility;
individual or group equality.74 Some definitions of equality are
more democratic than others. Equality based on birth, for exam-
71. See infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
72. WOOD, supra note 68, at 96-97.
73. Ronald Dworkin states that if the two concepts conflict, equality will always
trump liberty because it is "absurd that government should show no concern for the
lives of its citizens, and immoral that it should show more concern for the lives of
some than of others." Dworkin, supra note 52, at 9. There are two ways, he says, to
reconcile liberty and equality: liberty is either an instrumental step to achieving
equality or it is a "constitutive" part of equality. Id. at 13. Under his conception of
equality, equality of resources, liberty is a constitutive part of the very definition of
equality. Id. at 22-24.
74. There are as many fine books and articles on equality as there are on liberty.
See, e.g., DOUGLAS RAE ET AL., EQUALITIES (1981); AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY
REEXAMINED (1992); PETER WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQUALITY (1990); Ronald Dwor-
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pie, is less democratic than equality based on need, or even merit.
Some meanings are dramatically inconsistent with each other. For
instance, equality of opportunity holds that so long as each person
begins with the same opportunity of obtaining a given end, then
differing results are fair. Results or outcome equality, on the other
hand, requires that all end up with the same amount. Varying con-
ceptions of equality are illustrated by considering a situation in
which there are two people (A and B) in the world and $1000 to be
distributed. Equal opportunity states that so long as each person
has an equal opportunity to acquire the $1000, then the result is
fair if A acquires $1000 and B acquires zero. Equal results de-
mands that A and B each get $500. Equal needs, on the other
hand, might require a distribution of $700 to A and $300 to B.
Plato said that there are only two types of equality: numerical
and proportional.75 Numerical-or strict equality-is the simplest
and perhaps the paradigmatic76 meaning of equality. This is the
sense contained in the political equality mentioned earlier: every-
one has equal rights to freedom of speech, religion, the right to
vote, and so forth. It is an equality of lots, or per capita equality:
everyone gets the same (equal) amount of the same goods. Treat-
ing everyone the same, however, assumes that everyone is the
same. Prohibiting everyone the right to sleep on park benches is
equal treatment only in a narrow sense of the words. Similarly,
giving everyone wheel chairs, left-handed golf clubs, and bicycles is
also equal treatment. Such treatment ignores individual needs,
desires, resources, talents, and abilities. Thus strict equality fails to
treat individuals with equal concern and respect.
In the tax system, strict or per capita equality results in a poll tax:
everyone pays the exact same amount of tax ($10,000, for example)
no matter how much she earned or how much she needs to live on.
kin, What is Equality? Part 1, 10 PHIL. & PUn. Arn. 185 (1981); Part 2, 10 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 283 (1981); Part 3, supra note 52; and Part 4, 22 U.S.F.L. REV. 1 (1987).
Rae points out that there can be only one type of equality in one type of society
where policy could easily be based upon equality. Such a society would have the
following characteristics: 1) allocations occur only within the society which consists of
one class of members, 2) individuals are alike in all aspects, 3) there is a one time
allocation of all goods, 4) all goods can be divided into identical parts without de-
creasing the total value of the whole, and 5) there is "dichotomous" thinking-some-
thing is either true or not true. RAE, supra, at 6.
75. PLATO, THE LAWS OF PLATO, Bk. VI, Ch. 757 (A.E. Taylor trans., 1960). Per
capita equality can be viewed as simply a subset of proportional equality where the
ratio is always 1:1. Aristotle basically equated proportionality with distributive jus-
tice. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, 127-28 (J.A.K. Thomson trans., 1953).
76. See, e.g., WESTEN, supra note 74, at 146-55.
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When Great Britain recently enacted a poll tax, the public re-
sponse was outrage-people protested, burned their assessments,
and rioted.77 The paradigm of per capita equality apparently does
not hold up in reality.
Under proportional equality everyone does not get the identical
amount of a good; rather, each gets an amount proportionate to
what she deserves according to a particular standard. The ratio of
X goods distributed to Y people must be the same for each person.
In other words, people must pay the same percentage. Represen-
tative Armey's reference to fairness as "sameness," in the context
of proposing a flat 17% tax, was an appeal to proportional equality.
Consider the distribution of 175 pounds of food to 3 people: A,
B, and C. Per capita equality says each should get 58 and 1/3
pounds. Proportional equality says that the distribution of food
should be determined by reference to a standard such that the pro-
portion or ratio of food to that standard remains constant. If the
standard is weight, for example, and A weighs 200 pounds, B
weighs 100, and C weighs 50, then A will get 100 pounds of food, B
will get 50, and C will get 25. The distribution is proportionate in
that there is a constant ratio of 2:1 (weight:food). If the relevant
criterion is income, and A's income is $50,000, B's is $100,000, and
C's is $200,000, then A will get 25 pounds of food, B will get 50,
and C will get 100 ( for an income-to-food ratio of 2000:1). If the
criterion is moral worth and everyone has the same moral worth,
then A, B, and C will get 58 1/3 pounds of food each. In this in-
stance a proportionate distribution is a per capita distribution-
everyone gets the same amount. Setting the standard or criterion
for determining the distribution is problematic. We are more com-
fortable with some equalities than with others because we find
their standards to be more democratic. 78
77. See, e.g., David Connett et al., Mobs Riot in West End, THE INDEPENDENT
(London), Apr. 1, 1990, at 1; Heather Mills,et al., Wave of Violence Sweeps Through
West End, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Apr. 2, 1990, at 2 (417 injured, 341 arrested).
Thomas Cooley called poll taxes "odious" in his 19th Century treatise. EPSTEIN,
supra note 19, at 297 (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
613 (5th ed. 1883)). Richard Epstein stated that such a tax is an "illicit redistribution
to the rich." Id.
78. See Brian Barry, A Grammar of Equality, NEW REPUBLIC, May 12, 1982, at 36,
38-39 (review of RAE, supra note 74). We find some standards more meritorious than
others. According to Aristotle, democrats measure merit according to status as a free
man so that goods are distributed per capita to all free men; oligarchs determine merit
according to wealth and social position; and aristocrats measure merit according to
nobility of birth. WESTEN, supra note 74, at 56-57 (citing ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN
ETHICS Bk. V, Ch. 3 1131a20-30, ARISTOTLE, POLITICS Bk. V, Ch. 1 1301a27-b5 and
ARISTOTLE, POLITICS Bk. III, Ch. 3 1280a).
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An early, commonly held American view of equality is equality
of opportunity for the individual. Emerson calls this "the most dis-
tinctive and compelling element of our national ideology. ' 79 This
meaning of equality is consistent with positive liberty and with the
preconditions necessary for negative liberty. Equality of opportu-
nity is connected fundamentally to the basic revolutionary premise
of our country. Implicit in the abolition of privilege and hierarchy
is the belief that each individual is as good as the next person and is
entitled to the same opportunity to achieve or obtain as every
other person. Equality of opportunity will lead to equality of re-
sults only if everyone has the same characteristics as well as the
same opportunities. If people differ in such qualities as talents,
abilities, desires, and effort, these varying characteristics (or inputs)
when combined with the uniform input of opportunity will produce
different results. These unequal results will be "fair" both under
this norm of equality and under the principle of negative liberty
since equality of opportunity existed.
Under the norms of equality of opportunity and negative liberty
a free market system is the appropriate system to further both lib-
erty and equality if equality of opportunity exists. Such a system
treats everyone equally (gives no advantages to anyone) and gives
each person maximum liberty. Everyone begins the race at the
starting line; how the race finishes depends on each individual's
uncoerced actions and her own particular skill, effort, and desire.
If there is not equal opportunity, however, if there are barriers
preventing some from getting to the starting line, then-according
79. RAE, supra note 74, at 64 (quoting Emerson); see also WOOD, supra note 68,
at 233-34. Rae points out that there are two forms of "opportunity" equality which
are rarely distinguished from each other. "Prospect regarding" equality holds that
each has the same statistical probability of attaining X. For example, each person has
a 1 in 1000 chance of becoming president of IBM or winning the lottery. "Means
regarding" equality requires that the rules to obtain X be the same for all. However,
because each person has differing talents, skills, etc., the chances or prospects of each
person obtaining X will differ. Whereas prospect regarding equality ignores individ-
ual differences, means regarding equality allows those differences to determine the
outcome and therefore is consistent with the market economy. Rae believes that the
"ideological power of equal opportunity.., lies very largely in the prospect-regarding
variant .... RAE, supra note 74, at 66-67; accord WESTEN, supra note 74, at 172-73
(giving the example of a track race where there are no formal barriers to participa-
tion-equal access to participation under equal conditions (same track, same starting
time)-but there is not equal opportunity to win, since participants have different
racing abilities). Westen states that equal opportunity is also ambiguous in that it
does not mean the same opportunity in all respects but merely the same according to
a particular standard of measurement such as ability or formal characteristics. Equal
opportunity removes particular barriers such as those of race, gender, or ability. The
trick is determining which obstacles are relevant. Id. at 171-77.
1996]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIII
to a recent view of equality-unequal treatment is necessary or fair
to the extent that such treatment moves the disadvantaged person
up to the starting line. This view justifies affirmative action pro-
grams designed to get people to the starting line. Of course, one
person's equal opportunity is another person's denial of opportu-
nity.80 Whites or males claiming reverse discrimination, for exam-
ple, fall into this category.
Equality of needs is the second half of the Marxist dictum "from
each according to his ability; to each according to his need."
Under this standard, the 175 pounds of food in my earlier example
would not be distributed 58 and 1/3 pounds to each of three people;
nor would it be distributed according to each person's relative
wealth (and ability to purchase the goods) or even according to
effort. Rather, the food would be distributed according to the prin-
ciple of need. Of course, determining the standard of need is diffi-
cult. Should need be determined by state of hunger, health,
weight, or metabolism, for instance?
A Marxist equality of needs seems adverse to our capitalist na-
tion. Nevertheless, this type of equality is often a determining
principle. Certainly, equality of needs exists in the private sphere
of family, but it sometimes exists in the public sphere as well. Vari-
ous social welfare programs, for example, incorporate an equality
of need-at least to the extent of providing minimums-for the
distribution of food, housing, medical, and even legal care. Exam-
ples of these programs are unemployment benefits, supplemental
social security, and aid to dependent children. In the tax area, ex-
amples include the refundable earned income credit and the non-
refundable credit for the elderly and permanently disabled. Equal-
ity of need meshes with positive liberty and with equality of oppor-
tunity. By meeting basic needs, this equality helps "level the
playing field" so that each person can take advantage of opportuni-
ties and exercise their freedom.
Equality of contributions requires that outcomes should be pro-
portional to the inputs. Whether the resulting distribution is nu-
merically equal depends on which contributions are deemed
relevant. If the contribution is one owned equally by all-such as
citizenship-then the resulting distribution of goods will be equal
(one person, one vote). If, however, people possess differing
amounts of input, then the goods will be distributed unequally.
80. "When a society creates opportunities by removing obstacles that affect peo-
ple differentially, it necessarily denies an opportunity to people who benefit from the
differential." WESTEN, supra note 74, at 177 (citing RAE, supra note 74, at 69).
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Equality based on effort, for example, does not create the same
distribution as equality based on talent or skill: two children may
expend the same amount of effort in writing a term paper, but the
coherency, depth of analysis, etc., of the papers may vary drasti-
cally. Two entrepreneurs may each invest $100,000, but the first
may invest in Edsels and the second in McDonalds. Equality of
contribution (by amount) would require that both entrepreneurs
earn the same amount on their investments. Equality of contribu-
tion (by effort) requires that both students get the same grade and
both entrepreneurs receive the same return on investment;
whereas equality of contribution (by skill or talent) leads to une-
qual outcomes. The distribution, of course, may be determined not
by individual contribution but by luck.
Equality can be applied at the group level rather than the indi-
vidual level. Society can require that each individual have equality
with every other individual (be it equality of opportunity, results or
some other conception of equality) or it can require that the groups
as a whole have the same equality.8' Assume there is $1 million to
be divided up between two relevant groups of people (the Blues
and the Greens), and each group has 500 people in it. Individual-
results equality requires that each individual receive $1000; group
equality simply requires that the Blues and the Greens as a whole
each receive $500,000. Group equality says nothing about the divi-
sion of the $500,000 within each group. Within a group, some indi-
viduals might get $2000 and some might get nothing.
Many other meanings of equality also exist. This discussion
merely illustrates the multifaceted nature of the concept of equal-
ity. Out of the many possible meanings of the term, the major con-
ceptions of equality held in this country are equality of
opportunity, equality of merit, and to a lesser extent, equality of
needs. These conceptions draw their strength from the particular,
concrete experiences in American history, which in turn have cre-
ated a deep-seated, widespread tradition in America which is de-
scribed in the following section.
C. Moral Economic Individualism
I have argued elsewhere that there exists a tradition in America
which I have labeled "moral economic individualism." This tradi-
81. See, e.g., RAE, supra note 74, at 20-38; Adeno Addis, Individualism, Commu-
nitarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic Minorities, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 615, 652-55
(1991); Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious Districting: A
Case of the Emperor's Clothes, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1589, 1597 (1993).
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tion has two intertwined strands-one which exalts individualism
and its resultant unequal wealth distributions and another which,
contradictorily, urges a more equal, "democratic" distribution.82
At various time periods in our history, the accumulation strand has
dominated; at others the more egalitarian strand predominates. 83
The dual nature of the tradition of moral economic individualism
limits the reach of each strand and causes constant societal conflict
and contradiction as each strand exerts its influence.
The roots of the conflict lie within the three elements which com-
prise the tradition: 1) a conception of liberty which is primarily the
negative "freedom from"; 2) a conception of equality primarily as
equality of opportunity and merit; and 3) a moral belief in the vir-
tue of wealth arising from personal effort. This section examines
the third-or moral-element since the first two have already
been explored.
The moral element which glorifies work and its material rewards
is based on what is frequently called the "Protestant Ethic." This
ethic derives from the belief that every Christian had two "call-
ings": a general one to lead a godly life and a specific one whereby
each person serves God through his special calling, or vocation,
and thereby serves the common good.84 Max Weber has described
the connection between capitalism and Protestantism, particularly
Calvinism, as stemming from the doctrines of election and predes-
tination.85 Because these doctrines pre-ordained who was saved, a
person could not obtain grace from his worldly acts. Nevertheless,
82. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Morality of Money: American Attitudes Towards
Wealth and the Income Tax, 70 IND. L. J. 119 (1994).
83. In the past century, for example, the glorification of wealth accumulation in
the Gilded Age of the 1880s and 1890s was followed by more egalitarian concerns of
the Progressive Era; the 1920s wealth accumulation was followed by the New Deal
programs of the 1930s; the most recent period of rampant accumulation was the
1980's. See Kevin P. Phillips, U.S. Industrial Policy: Inevitable and Ineffective, HARV.
Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1992, at 117.
84. See, e.g., A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN THOUGHT AND SOCIETY
32 (Charles Crowe ed. 1965) (quoting Cotton Mather). For a more detailed discus-
sion of this topic, as well as a source of reading material on the subject, see generally
Kornhauser, supra note 82.
85. MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 103-
13 and 151-71 (Talcott Parsons trans. 1976). Although Weber has been criticized by
commentators, the idea of a spiritual connection to wealth has become part of the
American Myth. See, e.g., CHARLES SELLERS, THE MARKET REVOLUTION: JACKSO-
NIAN AMERICA 1815-1846, at 29-30 (1991) ("Calvinism also became the spiritual me-
dium of capitalist transformation by sanctifying worldly work as religious duty and
wealth as fruit of grace."); Kornhauser, supra note 82, at 125; Kathleen Deveny, Im-
migrants: Still Believers After All These Years, WALL ST. J., July 12, 1994, at B1 ("The
American work ethic also has its roots in religious belief."). On the universalization
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a person was obliged to act as if he were one of the elect, or else he
was considered to lack faith. One did this through his special call-
ing, by working hard and accumulating wealth not for its own sake
but because God created man to work, and through work man glo-
rified God. Wealth was thus a visible sign of God's grace. Industri-
ousness and hard work were virtuous traits and those who became
wealthy by exercising these traits were therefore virtuous. Under
this view, virtue attaches to wealth only if the wealth is the result of
those traits through which man practiced his vocation and thereby
glorified God-traits such as hard work, thrift, foresight, and plan-
ning. Inherited wealth, therefore, trails no clouds of glory; even
Andrew Carnegie was against it.86 Investment income, even
though it is the result of the virtue of thriftiness, does not elicit for
its owner the paeans of praise that earned income does-particu-
larly when it is income earned via an entrepreneurial venture.
By now the "Protestant Ethic" has become so ecumenical that
the American ethos generally glorifies enterprise and the entrepre-
neur.87 People such as John Rockefeller, Andrew Carnegie, and
Bill Gates win the praise of both presidents and writers, as well as
the admiration of the masses.
Entrepreneurs epitomize the three strains of moral economic in-
dividualism: liberty, equality, and morality. Free from coercion by
others-especially the government-each individual has equal op-
portunity to accomplish deeds and acquire goods via the virtuous
traits of work, thrift, and planning. The resultant wealth reflects
the acquirer's moral worth and expands his liberty because possess-
of the Protestant Ethic into the American ethic, see Kornhauser, supra note 82, at
125,157.
86. Andrew Carnegie, The Gospel of Wealth, 143 N. AM. REV. 653 (June 1889),
reprinted in THE GOSPEL OF WEALTH AND OTHER TIMELY ESSAYS 14, 20 (Edward C.
Kirkland ed., 1965).
87. See, e.g., GEORGE GILDER, THE SPIRIT OF ENTERPRISE 19 (1984) ("It is the
entrepreneurs who know the... laws of God.... They are the heroes of economic
life."). Gilder was the prophet of Reaganomics. Representative Jack Kemp, in con-
nection with the 1986 Tax Reform Act envisioned an America "that liberates people,
enterprises, and human capital through a continuing revolution of Democratic capital-
ism .... 132 CONG. REC. E2855 (daily ed. Aug. 13, 1986) (statement of Rep. Jack
Kemp (R-NY)). Ronald Reagan also glorified enterprise and the entrepreneur:
Those who say that we're in a time when there are no heroes, they just
don't know where to look. You can see heroes every day going in and out of
factory gates.... There are entrepreneurs with faith in themselves and faith
in an idea who can create new jobs, new wealth and opportunity.
AMOS KIEWE & DAVIS W. HOUCK, A SHINING CITY ON A HILL 138 (1991) (quoting
Reagan's first inaugural address).
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ing more material goods creates more opportunities to develop
morally and spiritually and to reach his goals.
A person's increased wealth benefits society in general by in-
creasing the liberty and, to some extent, the equality of the less
wealthy. This occurs in two ways. First, economic growth is
widely-but not universally-believed to trickle down to the poor.
A larger pie means a bigger piece for everyone. As Andrew Car-
negie noted, large accumulations of wealth allow for the cheap pro-
duction of goods which makes them more affordable to the poor.
This, he said, "does not tend to make the rich poorer, but it does
tend to make the poor richer in the possession of better things, and
greatly lessens the wide and deplorable gulf between the rich and
the poor. '88 While the past decade's widening gap between rich
and poor has shown that economic growth does not inevitably
lessen economic inequality, much of society still seems to believe
that growth increases liberty, providing a better materialistic basis
for exercising free will. Moreover, conventional wisdom holds that
the costs of decreasing inequality are high in terms of decreasing
economic efficiency (and growth), though recently some econo-
mists are changing their views and now "see greater income equal-
ity as compatible with faster growth-and perhaps even
contributing to it." 89
The second way accumulated wealth aids society is through the
concept of trusteeship of wealth: the holder of great wealth, ac-
cording to this theory, does not own the wealth for his own per-
sonal benefit but holds it as a steward or trustee for the people.
Andrew Carnegie's belief that a person must disperse his wealth
during his lifetime in uplifting ways is an example of the steward-
ship of wealth. The money must be gifted in ways that will help
people help themselves, rather than as handouts. Wealth should be
used, in other words, to ensure equality of opportunity. Thus, Car-
negie urged that the wealthy endow institutions such as libraries
and schools.90 The trustee concept has been criticized for the obvi-
ous reason that the owner of wealth receives many personal bene-
88. CARNEGIE, supra note 43, at 83.
89. Sylvia Nasar, Economics of Equality: A New View, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1994, at
39. For the traditional view, see, e.g., ARTHUR OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY
(1975); Edgar K. Browning & William R. Johnson, The Trade-off Between Equality
and Efficiency, 92 J. POL. ECON. 175, 201 (1984) (redistribution via wage rate or earn-
ings subsidies such as the earned income credit may be more efficient than redistrib-
uting via a tax-and-transfer system).
90. Carnegie, The Gospel of Wealth, supra note 86, at 27-28.
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fits, including social status, power, and security. Nevertheless,
there are still people who endorse this view.9
Moral economic individualism-as epitomized by Carnegie, the
benevolent entrepreneur-sanctions merit-based outcomes equal-
ity. One deserves what she acquires through merit (primarily de-
fined as her skill, talent, and effort) because: 1) liberty declares
that the economic race for goods is valuable because it is the un-
coerced means to self-fulfillment; 2) equality of opportunity as-
sures that the race is fair, that everyone has a chance; and 3) our
morality asserts that the rewards (money, goods) are the result of
the virtuous traits of effort, thrift, and foresight and are, therefore,
merited.92
Merit outcomes equality, however, has contradictory effects. At
the individual level, merit equality dictates that each person with
equal merit receive equal economic distributions. For the popula-
tion as a whole, merit equality means that the just distribution of
goods will be an unequal one. Those people possessing greater
merit-as determined by such criteria as skill, talent, or perhaps
risk-taking ability-will receive a greater portion of the proverbial
pie. Merit equality is premised on the existence of equal opportu-
nity which can be destroyed by the very wealth inequality that
merit equality produces.
Outcomes equality, however, can lead to both great wealth and
political inequalities. Wealth inequalities may endanger the liberty
of individuals by creating conditions of poverty which prevent
some people from acquiring the essential goods necessary for au-
tonomy and self development. Moreover, wealth inequalities are
also dangerous to society as a whole. Concentrations of wealth
lead to concentrations of power which threaten to undermine the
political equality essential to our government. Consequently, our
belief in outcomes equality, which leads to wealth accumulations
and disparities, is confronted by an opposing urge towards greater
wealth distributions. Merit equality thus is tempered both by a
needs equality and by a desire to narrow the gap between the out-
ermost distributions. The latter is not a desire for strict or equal
lots equality per se; it is simply a desire to limit the extremes-to
smooth out but not level the distribution patterns.
91. See., e.g., Eliza Newlin Carney, Bodies and Souls, 27 NAT'L J. 2651, 2653
(1995) (discussing George Bush's and Ronald Reagan's stress of voluntary charity).
92. See PETER MCCLELLAND, THE AMERICAN SEARCH FOR ECONOMIC JUSTICE
25 (1990) (stating these are the reasons people believe that an unequal distribution of
goods is fair).
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Moral economic individualism, with its two contrasting elements
both favoring and opposing great accumulations of wealth, creates
multiple norms for distributive justice. Its beliefs in negative lib-
erty and equality of opportunity support a free market system of
exchange that permits governmental intervention only when op-
portunity becomes so unequal that interference is necessary to
remedy the imbalance. Negative liberty and equality of opportu-
nity together justify an economic distribution based on merit, with
merit usually defined by effort, skill, education, and foresight.
Merit equality is tempered, however, by the ideas of pre-conditions
of liberty (or positive liberty), needs equality, and fear of concen-
trations of wealth which can lead to the deprivation of liberty.
These ideas argue for a less unequal distribution than merit equal-
ity might otherwise produce.
Moral economic individualism's conceptions of liberty, equality,
and morality support our present tax system: mildly progressive
rates applied to a hybrid income-consumption base which has both
earned and unearned income preferences. The analysis of a just
tax, it will be remembered, requires that the burdens of revenue
raising be distributed fairly. Under some theories, a just tax must
do even more; it must also correct for the unjust pre-tax distribu-
tion of benefits. For both the (re)distribution of the benefits and
the distribution of the burdens, moral economic individualism ad-
vocates that the principles of negative liberty, equal opportunity,
and merit equality be modified by positive liberty, equality of
needs, and by a softening of unequal results to preserve political
liberty and equality. Guided by these principles, a just tax system
would have a progressive rate since those with more income have
more "ability to pay" than those with less income. The graduation,
however, would be mild in keeping with the beliefs in liberty, merit
equality, and the rewards of effort. It would also support specific
provisions in the Internal Revenue Code which help the needy
such as the § 32 earned income credit (and especially the proposal
to abolish the "earned" requirement), the § 22 credit for the eld-
erly and handicapped, the § 42 low-income housing credit, and the
phase-out of credits designed primarily to help the needy (arguably
the § 44A child care provisions, for example). The system would
have provisions that both favor earned income (again the earned
income credit and pension provisions such as §§ 219 and 401, which
are based on earned income) and those that generally facilitate the
accumulation of wealth for investment purposes (such as capital
gains provisions and tax-free exchange provisions such as § 1031
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like-kind exchanges and § 368 reorganizations). The simultaneous
favoring of capital accumulation and emphasis on earned income
creates a somewhat inherently contradictory system which has as-
pects of both an income and a consumption tax. In short, the tax
would look remarkably like our present tax system.
Il. Distributive Justice, the Income Tax, and Empirical Studies
Part II has shown how the concepts of liberty and equality-as
viewed through the lens of moral economic individualism-sup-
port a complex sense of distributive justice. The overriding princi-
ple is one of merit distribution, with merit primarily defined as
effort, talent, and ability. This equality of merit leads to a general
belief in the justness of economic inequality, but an economic ine-
quality with important limiting principles. First, the unequal distri-
bution must be premised on the availability of equal opportunity.
Second, the unequal distribution must be modified by appropriate
distributions according to need. Finally, the unequal distribution
by merit must be narrowed, but not eliminated, if necessary for the
preservation of individual and political liberty.
This Part examines some empirical studies on the subjects of dis-
tributive justice and taxation and concludes that the data tend to
support the distributive pattern described above. The inherent
flaws in the examined data necessitate that any conclusion can be
only suggestive. Both opinion polls (surveys) and controlled labo-
ratory experiments, the two types of empirical data examined here,
have serious drawbacks. For example, experiments which require
subjects actually to distribute goods are marred by the simple fact
that they are controlled experiments and not real life. It is one
thing to act in a certain manner when a person is in a simplified,
controlled environment and another to act in the same manner in
the multi-stimuli situation of life. Opinion polls also have major
drawbacks whether they are conducted in the form of open-ended
or multiple choice questions. For example, subjects say one thing
and often do another. Also, results are extremely sensitive to the
language used in the survey. How the designer of the poll phrases
the possible responses or even the questions affects the ultimate
answer.
Tax attitudes are particularly sensitive to the language used in a
poll because most people are fiscally ignorant. They fail to make
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the "fiscal connection" between taxation and benefits.93 Conse-
quently, the framing of the question greatly influences the re-
sponse. For example, questions, phrased in the abstract or in a
positive manner produce different results from questions phrased
in the particular or in the negative. People are more likely, for
example, to favor taxation in general if specific benefits are men-
tioned and more likely to favor progressive taxation if the question
is phrased abstractly.94
Ignorance of taxation causes other problems relating to people's
attitudes towards taxes. First, the greater the visibility of a particu-
lar tax, the more likely it is to be viewed as unfair.95 This explains
why the income tax is more unpopular than a sales tax even though
the latter is more regressive.96 Second, the media's power to affect
attitudes is large, since what the media stiesses forms a large part
of the public's knowledge. For example, the media stresses margi-
nal rates rather than effective rates. This emphasis is reflected in
one study that showed the typical citizen will pick as a fair average
tax rate a rate close to statutory marginal rates (as opposed to the
actual effective rate) but will choose in dollars an amount close to
the current effective or average rate.97
93. See, e.g., ALAN LEWIS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TAXATION 42 (1982). The more
educated a person is the more likely she is to be fiscally knowledgeable and to have a
high income. In general, the higher one's income, the less support one gives to taxing
and spending. Nevertheless, there is evidence that people with higher incomes are
more willing to pay taxes in order to increase public services. Id. at 57.
Of course, ignorance about tax laws generally must affect individual attitudes as
well. Treasury Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy Leslie B. Samuels has stated that the
current attacks on the tax system are the result of "a great deal of misunderstanding
about the system and how it works." Chuck Davenport, Tax System Under Attack,
Samuels Tells Law Schools, 95 TAX NOTES TODAY 9-5 (Jan. 13, 1995), available in
WESTLAW, TNT database. To illustrate this misunderstanding, Samuels cited an
opinion poll which showed that many people believed a value-added tax has been
enacted under the Clinton administration. Id.
94. LEWIS, supra note 93, at 48 (Lewis provides a chart depicting how to phrase
the questions to produce a particular result); Michael L. Roberts et al., Attitudes To-
ward Progressive Taxation, 58 PuB. OPINION Q. 165, 185 (1994) (undergraduate tax
students favored progressivity when asked abstractly whether a flat or progressive tax
was fairer, but favored a flat tax when questioned about two named individuals who
earned specific amounts of money).
95. LEwIs, supra note 93, at 42.
96. Income taxes, especially federal income taxes, almost consistently are rated
less fair. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, CHANGING
PUBLIC ATITITUDES ON GOVERNMENTS AND TAXES 1-2 (1993). But see Tom Herman,
Tax Report, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 1995, at Al (Louis Harris & Associates poll for
Lutheran Brotherhood found sales and property taxes more unpopular than federal
income taxes).
97. Michael L. Roberts & Peggy A. Hite, Progressive Taxation, Fairness, and Com-
pliance, 16 LAW & POL'Y 27, 40-42 (1994). Another problem with tax studies is the
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The debate over the income tax occurring as this Article was
written also exemplifies the relation of the media to opinions.
There are so many sound bites and so much rhetoric that it seems
harder than ever to determine the public's true feelings. When a
consumption tax is not labeled as such, but merely as a flat tax, it is
difficult to determine what the public really favors.98 As the presi-
dential primaries begin, the rhetoric only increases. The resultant
overdose of rhetoric makes current polls even more unreliable than
those conducted in less incendiary times.
Another related difficulty with tax opinion polls is the relation-
ship between conceptions of distributive justice and actual distribu-
tions. Does the existing distribution affect our normative beliefs or
do our normative beliefs affect our perception of reality? How ac-
curate, in fact, is our perception of reality? These questions, the
subject of debate in sociology literature, obviously have enormous
impact on distributive justice but their resolution is not clear.99
definition of class in America. Many studies formulate questions in terms of tax bur-
dens or income distributions according to upper, middle, or lower income. The prob-
lem is that most Americans define themselves as middle class. See, e.g., LARRY
HUGICK & LYDIA SAAD, PUBLIC BELIEVES TAXES UNFAIRLY HIT MIDDLE-CLASS.
POOR, THE ROPER CENTER FOR PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH, THE GALLUP POLL 1
(1992):
"Upper-income" may mean "makes more than I do." While 60 percent of
those with household incomes over $50,000 feel that their own taxes are too
high, it appears they don't consider themselves to be in an upper-income
bracket. This $50,000 and over group is about as likely as those who earn
less to say 'upper-income' people pay too little in taxes (73 percent vs. 78
percent).
Id. On the effect of the media, see, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 93, at 72-73. V.O. Keys has
stated that the interested, knowledgeable portion of the American public rarely ex-
ceeds 20% except in times of crisis. Id. at 74. The figure is probably considerably
lower for such an intimidating, technical, and arcane subject as tax. See also, BENJA-
MIN I. PAGE & ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO, THE RATIONAL PUBLIC: FIFTY YEARS OF
TRENDS IN AMERICANS' POLICY PREFERENCES 355-383 (1992) (Media, officials and
experts affect the public's knowledge and often manipulate the public. Nevertheless,
the public can and does form rational opinions.).
98. See, e.g., Washington Wire, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 1995, at Al. ("Republicans
increasingly fret that fiat-tax proposals may not be so popular once the public under-
stands the specifics."). See infra note 123 for results of public polls.
99. See, e.g., Norma Shepelak & Duane F. Alwin, Beliefs About Inequality and
Perceptions of Distributive Justice, 51 Am. Soc. REV. 30 (1986); Bruce Headey, Dis-
tributive Justice and Occupational Incomes: Perceptions of Justice Determine Percep-
tions of Fact, 42 BR. J. Soc. 581 (1991). Headey, using Australian data, concludes that
people's perceptions of income distribution do not accurately reflect reality but they
do reflect their normative standards. In other words: "a normative standard of equal-
ity appears systematically to distort perceptions of reality. What ought to be largely
influences perceptions of what is, rather than vice versa. Perceptions of justice deter-
mine perceptions of fact." Id. at 593.
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Interpreting the data is another serious issue. What does it
mean, for example, when people believe the deductions for mort-
gage interest and property taxes are fair? Their belief may reflect
their desire to increase housing construction which indicates a self-
interested, rational man, efficiency approach to distribution. On
the other hand, it may reflect a belief that homeowners have a right
to housing subsidies or it may even reflect a belief in a more gen-
eral right to housing subsidies for all, a needs-based distributive
approach. 00
A final difficulty inherent in tax opinion polls is the complex ar-
ray of issues involved in this area. These are both political and
personal. For example, over a long period of time polls consist-
ently show, with a few exceptions, that people believe the taxes
they pay are too high.1 1 Why people say this, however, can vary.
Partly, it may be a visceral response to parting with money that is
"theirs." The response, however, also may reflect people's belief
that their taxes are too high relative to the taxes paid by others.1 0 3
In other words, a person might not mind paying X dollars of tax so
long as others pay their "fair share" and do not get special privi-
leges and loopholes. Partly, the response may arise from a political
belief not that the taxes are too high but that they are spent on the
wrong programs. More basically, the response may reflect a polit-
ical belief about the nature (and limits) of government. Because of
these many possible rationales for a "too high" response, this type
of poll says less about distributive justice principles than may ap-
pear at first glance.
Despite the shortcomings of empirical studies, their results do
have some evidentiary value when considered as a whole. What
emerges from the studies is a general pattern, most notable for
100. Karyl A. Kinsey et al., Framing Justice: Taxpayer Evaluations of Personal Tax
Burdens, 25 LAW & Soc. REv. 845, 849, 866 (1991). The authors believe that taxpay-
ers use either an outcome processing or a norm-processing frame to evaluate tax fair-
ness. Outcome processing frames assume rational, self-interested individuals, who
focus on utilitarian concerns and evaluate fairness based on an exchange theory of
costs and benefits whereas norm processing frames use peoples' "normative beliefs
about the legal rights and moral obligations of themselves and others." Id. at 84.
Which frame one uses is affected by the particular tax policy and the individual's
situation. Id. at 864.
101. PAGE & SHAPIRO, supra note 97, at 160.
102. See, e.g., Norbert Lloyd Enrick, A Pilot Study of Income Tax Consciousness, 16
NAT'L. TAX J. 169 (1963). One person refused to participate in the author's study,
stating: "I don't know what my taxes are. I think taxes are far too high, but there is
no use worrying about it. No point in knowing exactly what I paid, so long as I know
it was too much." Id. at 170.
103. See, PAGE & SHAPIRO, supra note 97, at 160.
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what it lacks. What is lacking is one single overarching principle of
distributive justice which applies-undiluted-to all situations.
Rather, what emerges is a complex, flexible set of principles which
mixes principles of inequality and equality, distributions based on
merit and distributions based on need.
Several experimental studies examine subjects' general distribu-
tive justice preferences, sometimes taking tax into consideration,
sometimes not. Elizabeth Hoffman and Matthew Spitzer, for ex-
ample, conducted a series of experiments from which they con-
cluded that subjects divided rewards under a "Lockean theory of
earned deserts" when the subjects felt they had earned their re-
wards; subjects divided rewards under an egalitarian theory when
the subjects felt there was no moral basis for the rewards. 1°4 Other
experiments, such as those by Norman Frohlich and Joe Oppen-
heimer, have shown that most people use neither Rawls' difference
principle nor any entitlement system exclusively. These studies
show that most subjects (more than 75%) use a combined principle
of effort and of need. Under these combined principles they maxi-
mize the group's average income, but they also institute a floor be-
low which the worst-off cannot fall.10 5
These experimental studies indicate that Americans did not ap-
ply a single norm such as the difference principle or merit equality
to all situations. Rather, they used mixed principles to justify une-
qual wealth distributions (distribution according to merit) and to
lessen (but not eliminate) by an equality of need that looks beyond
narrow self-interest and merit-to need. The experimental results
are confirmed by certain opinion surveys, as discussed below.
Americans support the inequality created by merit distributions
because of their strong belief in the principle of equal opportunity
104. Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Entitlements, Rights, and Fairness:
An Experimental Examination of Subjects' Concepts of Distributive Justice, 14 J.
LEGAL STUD. 259, 261, 281 (1985).
105. Norman Frohlich & Joe A. Oppenheimer, Choosing Justice in Experimental
Democracies With Production, 84 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 461, 463 (1990) ("mixed princi-
ple" of maximizing goods for the group is subject to a constraint that the worst off not
fall below a predetermined floor is chosen more than 75% of the time). See also
Lissowski et al., supra note 4, at 100 (citing their own and other studies). Interest-
ingly, in the authors' study both Polish and American groups chose Rawls's difference
principle which would maximize the minimum income last. Id. at 115.
Some of the experiments actually distributed money while the latter ones merely
discussed hypothetical distributions. Nevertheless, the former is not necessarily a
more accurate predictor of real-life results since it dealt with extremely limited
amounts of money in a very controlled situation where needs criteria were inapplica-
ble. The hypothetical distributions in the other experiments, however, dealt with total
income amounts which might reflect other considerations more accurately.
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which assures everyone an equal chance to obtain the rewards.
They believe in unequal outcomes (varying amounts of income), so
long as the process (equal opportunity) gives everyone an equal
chance at achieving the wealth. 116 This is not surprising given the
tradition of equality and liberty discussed in Part II. The current
battle raging over affirmative action is not a fight about whether
equal opportunity is a good thing. There is a broad consensus on
that issue. The disagreement occurs over whether such opportu-
nity actually exists. 10 7 If equal opportunity exists, there is no need
for governmental "affirmative actions" to promote it; if equal op-
portunity does not exist, then the question becomes what, if any-
thing, ought society do to create it. While polls show disagreement
106. A 1993 survey, for example, asked the following question:
Some people think America should promote equal opportunity for all,
that is, allowing everyone to compete for jobs and wealth on a fair and even
basis. Other people think America should promote equal outcomes, that is,
insuring that everyone has a decent standard of living and that there are only
small differences in wealth and income between the top and bottom of soci-
ety. Which do you favor: promoting equal opportunity or promoting equal
outcomes?
Q. 243, General Social Survey, Feb. 5, 1993 - April 26, 1993, available in WESTLAW,
Poll-C Database (search for records containing "National Opinion Research Center"





Cf The following 1994 survey question:
Which is more important-insuring that each individual has as much op-
portunity as possible, even if that means some people enjoy far more success
than others or insuring greater equality of income, even if that limits individ-
ual opportunities?
Give each as much opportunity as possible 73%
Greater equality of income 17
Refused/don't know 9
Reader's Digest/Institute for Social Inquiry, Aug. 8, 1994 - Aug. 29, 1994, Q.0G7,
available in WESTLAW, Poll-C Database (search for records containing "Institute for
Social Inquiry" and "Equality" and da(aft 8-21-94)).
In 1979, however, only 59% of respondents agreed with the statement: "It is all
right for the good things in life to be distributed unequally, as long as everyone has an
equal opportunity to compete for them." Monitoring attitudes of the Public '79, May
29, 1979 - June 22, 1979, Q 38, available in WESTLAW, Poll-C Database (earch for
records containing "Yankelovich" and "Equal Opportunity" and da(aft 5-28-79))
(18% strongly disagreed; 23% had no opinion).
107. Polling data on affirmative action is difficult to interpret because people's defi-
nitions of affirmative action vary widely. Thus, the manner in which the question is
phrased has dramatic effects on the response. See, e.g., Jim Norman, Politics of the
Nineties: America's Verdict on Affirmative Action Is Decidedly Mixed, 6 THE PUBLIC
PERSPECTiVE (Roper Center for Public Opinion Research) 49 (June-July, 1993).
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on these two issues (existence of opportunity and governmental ac-
tion), belief in equal opportunity as an ideal is widespread.
Data on the existence of equal opportunity varies so widely that
it is impossible to give precise facts. Several trends seem clear,
however. Although the belief in the existence of equal opportunity
is fairly widespread, the extent has varied over the past decades. 108
Also, belief in the existence of equal opportunity increases as in-
come increases and is higher among whites than minorities. 109
Data on whether Americans as a society ought to do whatever is
necessary to achieve equal opportunity is particularly muddy be-
108. For a while, the extent of the belief decreased. In one 1994 poll, for example,
48% of respondents believed "Americans have an equal chance to succeed in life..."
(49% did not so believe). Readers Digest/Institute for Social Inquiry, Aug. 22, 1994 -
Aug 29, 1994, Q.003, available in WESTLAW, PoU-C Database (search for records
containing "equality" and "Institute for Social Inquiry" and da(aft 08-21-94)); accord
The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, General Social Surveys Q.387D p.
423 (1990) (49.9% of persons in national poll agreed with the statement "One of the
big problems in this country is that we don't give everyone an equal chance." 49.3%
disagreed.)
This contrasts with James Kluegel and Eliot Smith's 1988 finding that 70% of peo-
ple generally believe "there's plenty of opportunity and anyone who works hard can
go as far as he wants .... ." JAMES R. KLUEGEL & ELIOT R. SMITH, BELIEFS ABOUT
INEQUALITY 43-44 (1986). They state that their study shows a slight decline in the
existence of opportunity, citing a 1952 study showing 88% believed in the existence of
opportunity. Id. at 44.
109. See, e.g., JOAN HUBER & WILLIAM H. FORM, INCOME AND IDEOLOGY: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL FORMULA 171-172 (1973) (studying Anglos
& Chicanos). 75% (poor Chicanos) to 100% (middle income Anglos) believed they
had the same or better economic opportunities as others. Id. at 171. Support for the
existence of economic, educational and political opportunity in general ranged from
53% (high-income Chicanos) to 86% (high-income Anglos). Belief in equality in spe-
cific fields, however, was significantly lower: 19%-54% for "equal opportunity" of
poor and rich, 22%-86% for equal educational opportunity, 16%-54% for ability of
rich and poor to influence government equally. Id.; accord KLUEGEL & SMITH, supra
note 108, at 45-49 (using slightly later data and showing slight decline over time in
existence of equal opportunity). A recent 1993 poll shows significantly higher belief
in the existence of equal job opportunity among whites than blacks (70% versus
30%). However, the percentage of both groups that believed in the existence of equal
opportunity was higher than in 1963. C. Gray Wheeler, 30 Years Beyond "I Have A
Dream", THE GALLUP POLL MONTHLY, Oct. 1993, at 2, 4; accord Roper Center for
Public Opinion Research for NBC News, June 8-June 19, 1995, available in
WESTLAW, PoU-C Database (search for "equal opportunity" and da(aft 5/1/1995)
(74% of whites thought blacks and whites had equal job opportunities but only 25%
of blacks).
Part of the reason why earlier polls showed higher rates of belief in the existence of
equal opportunity may be that minorities were frequently underrepresented in the
polls. For example, one 1986 study which oversampled blacks and weighted results
for their proper proportion found that only 30% of respondents believed there were
equal opportunities for all. AMERICAN DREAM, Oct. 1986, available in WL, Poll-C
Database (search for records containing "Roper Organization" and "equal opportuni-
ties" and da (aft 10-86)).
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cause negative responses to questions about the necessity of action
may reflect either a belief that no actions are necessary because (i)
equal opportunity does not exist but such actions are inappropriate
for government or (ii) equal opportunity exists and therefore no
action is needed.
Nevertheless, support for societal action is consistently high.
Ninety percent of respondents in a 1987 poll "completely" or
"mostly" agreed with the statement "Our society should do what is
necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to
succeed."'110 By 1994, 91% so agreed, with the percentage com-
pletely agreeing rising from 37% to 52%. 111
Moving from the general to the specific, people often appear to
believe in their own specific equal opportunity. One study, for ex-
ample, found that approximately 70% of people generally believe
that there is plenty of opportunity but 90% believed their own op-
portunity was as good or better than the average. 112 Studies also
show that people evaluate the fairness of income and wealth distri-
bution primarily on a principle of liberty by approving outcomes
based on merit. Moreover, people tend to attribute their own in-
come to individual merit factors (such as ability) rather than to
non-deserving factors such as luck or structural factors, such as
political pull.113
110. Gallup Organization for Times Mirror, Apr. 25, 1987 - May 10,1987, Q.150,
available in WESTLAW, Poll-C Database (search for records containing "Gallup Or-
ganization" and "Equal Opportunity" and da(aft 4-24-87)).
111. Princeton Survey Research Associates, [PSRA], July 13, 1994 - July 27, 1994,
Q.25, available in WESTLAW, Pol-C Database (search for "Equal Opportunity" and
"Princeton Survey Research Associates" and da(aft 7-12-94)). These percentages and
the trends are fairly consistent. Older respondents seem to favor social action more
strongly than the general public. In a PSRA survey of 1510 adults for the AARP
from 8-12-92 to 9-08-92, 68% "completely" agreed with the statement, PSRA (for
American Association of Retired Persons), whereas a survey a few days later of 1508
adults showed only 53% completely agreeing with the statement. PSRA, Sept. 10-
1992 -Sept. 13,1992, Q55, available in WESTLAW, Poll-C Database (search for
"Princeton Survey Research Associates" and "Equal Opportunity" and da(aft 9-9-
92)). The difference seems to be that in the survey for the AARP, 35% of the survey
population was age 50 or older.
112. KLUEGEL & SMITH, supra note 108, at 44-46.
113. See, e.g., KLUEGEL & SMITHsupra note 108, at 76-84; Norma J. Shepelak &
Duane F. Alwin, Beliefs About Inequality and Perceptions of Distributive Justice, 51
AM. Soc. REV. 30, 43-44 (1986); Norma J. Shepelak, The Role of Self-Explanations
and Self-Evaluations in Legitimating Equality, 52 AM. Soc. REV. 495, 501 (1987); Sid-
ney Verba & Gary R. Orren, Rendering What's Due: Views on Income Equality, 8
PUB. OPINION 48, 52 (1985). Kluegel and Smith, however, found that 64% of their
respondents felt inherited money was a "very important" factor in determining
wealth. KLUEGEL & SMITH, supra note 108, at 77. They also found that the young
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Assuming equal opportunity exists, most people favor income in-
equality. They prefer, however, a less unequal distribution than
currently exists." 4 Study results, however, disagree on how people
believe that income gap should be narrowed. Some show that peo-
ple wish to narrow the gap, not by redistributing income from the
rich to the poor but by having a minimum, or floor, for lower in-
comes. 115 Such a belief meshes with what I have described as the
prevalent ideology: (i) a belief in equality of economic opportu-
nity, which means that each individual potentially may be rich, (ii)
a belief that wealth legitimately earned is an exercise of liberty,
and (iii) a belief in the morality of rewarding merit. 1 6 Another
study, however, shows that all groups (except business people)
would narrow the gap by decreasing top incomes, not increasing
the lowest ones.117 On the other hand, people do not favor limiting
or putting a ceiling on incomes," 8 most likely because such govern-
mental interference conflicts directly with their liberty interest and
with the belief that wealth (at least earned wealth) reflects moral
worth. Such conflicting results on the preferred method of lessen-
ing income inequality may reflect either methodological differences
such as the age of the studies, or different phrasing of questions.
The disagreement about how the income gap should be nar-
rowed does not seem to reflect widely disparate principles of distri-
bution. On the contrary, many studies show a basic agreement on
general principles of distribution. Most people believe that a just
distribution is not based solely on merit but is based on both merit
and need." 9 The existence of this dual standard may explain par-
believed less in individual courses of wealth (or poverty) than older folks. Id. at 76,
78.
114. KLUEGEL & SMITH, supra note 108, at 121. Accord Verba & Orren, supra note
113, at 50.
115. Wayne M. Alves & Peter H. Rossi, Who Should Get What? Fairness Judg-
ments of the Distribution of Earnings, 84 AM J. Soc. 541, 544 (1978). Support for a
minimum floor is a general statement which does not necessarily translate directly
into support for specific programs, such as minimum wage.
116. Cf. KLUEGEL & SMITH, supra note 108, at 165 (probable causes are: 1) opti-
mism that the individual will get rich, 2) wealth is seen as legitimately earned, and 3)
belief in the value of income inequality). Note that this failure to support redistribu-
tion from the rich conflicts with most people's belief that certain occupations earn too
much. Id. at 121.
117. Verba & Orren, supra note 113, at 50.
118. KLUEGEL & SMITH, supra note 108, at 165.
119. E.g., Alves & Rossi, supra note 115, at 551; Verba & Orren, supra note 113, at
52. These studies showed agreement on the principles of distribution (merit and
need) but disagreement on how to lessen inequality. See supra note 97. See also
Frohlich & Oppenheimer, supra note 105, at 463.
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tially the differing beliefs regarding the narrowing of income ine-
quality. General agreement on need and merit allows for flexibility
in the applications of each standard. Some people may stress need,
for example, while others stress merit.
The needs principle requires people to look beyond their own
self-interest and their own benefits and burdens and consider
others. Whereas the merit principle focuses on self-interest (I de-
serve this), the needs principle causes people to look beyond their
own interests to the interests of others.' ° Studies show that most
people believe that a just distribution of income takes into account
not only an individual's merit (did she deserve the goods?) but also
her needs, or at least the satisfaction of her minimum needs.12 1 Ev-
idence suggests that most people also believe that the government
should satisfy these minimum needs if individuals cannot do so
themselves. 22 Given these beliefs, the income tax system is an ap-
propriate vehicle for carrying out the "needs" strand of Americans'
sense of distributive justice. In particular, a mildly-progressive in-
come tax that implements a combined efforts-needs standard of
distribution would not be appropriate. Many-if not most-stud-
ies, in fact, show that a majority of the public does support progres-
sivity despite all the current publicity about flat taxes.123
120. This broader scope of concern can be defined as simply enlarged self-interest,
or "reciprocal altruism", a type of insurance which states "I'll help you now in case I
need you to help me later." As to the insurance aspect, see, e.g., Karol Edward Soltan,
Empirical Studies of Distributive Justice, 92 ETHICS 673, 683 (1982). See generally C.
R. BADCOCK, THE PROBLEM OF ALTRUISM (1986); GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON
THE FAMILY 179 (1981); EDWARD 0. WILSON, On Human Nature (1978).
121. See, e.g., Alves & Rossi, supra note 115, at 563; Norma J. Shepelak & Duane
F. Alwin, Beliefs About Income Inequality and Perceptions of Distributive Justice, 51
AM. Soc. REV. 30, 43 (1986).
122. See, e.g., TIMES MIRROR POLL, People, The Press & Politics, July 8, 1992.
Sixty-nine percent of the respondents "completely" or "mostly" agreed with the state-
ment "It is the responsibility of the government to take care of people who can't take
care of themselves." Id. at Q.67. The Poll was a national telephone poll of 3517 peo-
ple. 65% of respondents similarly agreed with the statement "The government should
guarantee every citizen enough to eat and a place to sleep." Id. at Q.69. Fifty-three
percent even agreed (completely or mostly), that the government should help the
needy "even if it means going deeper in debt". Id. at Q.68. In a recent study respon-
dents were asked how fair it was to spend government money on 1) shelters for vic-
tims of spousal abuse, 2) homeless shelters, 3) job training for the unemployed, 4)
medical care for AIDS patients, 5) college student loans, 6) preservation of endan-
gered species. Combined "somewhat fair"/very fair responses ranged from 71.5%
(endangered species) to 89.4% for job training. William J. Tumier et al., Redistribu-
tive Justice and Cultural Feminism, 45 AM. U. L. REV. - (1996) [forthcoming book 5].
The study found women somewhat more supportive of social spending than men.
123. The public opinion data on progressivity is particularly vulnerable to all the
difficulties of polling since the topic is not only highly charged politically but also is
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highly technical, if not arcane. Most people do not understand progressivity and the
difference between marginal and effective rates. Roberts & Hite, supra note 97, at 28,
40-42. Turnier's study shows strong evidence of the general populace's ignorance
and/or confusion. Public policy suggests that those favoring progressivity would also
oppose a capital gains preference. Yet the study showed only a weak correlation.
Turnier, supra note 122, n.114. A reasonable interpretation of this data is that the
inconsistency is due to respondents' confusion and the authors believe this "most
likely accounts" for the result. Id. n.56. Of course other explanations are possible.
For example, people may support progressivity generally, but see capital gains as par-
ticularly deserving of favorable treatment for various reasons, such as the risk in-
volved or the virtue of saving and investing. See, e.g., Kornhauser, supra note 82.
Despite the confusion, much of the public seems to favor progressivity. This is fine
despite the hot debate and strong rhetoric about the flat tax preceeding and during
the presidential primaries of 1996. See, e.g., The Flat Tax is Losing its Appeal Among
U.S. Voters, Poll Finds, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 1996 at R2 (Wall Street Journal/NBC
News poll showing a 54% to 39% support of a progressive tax); accord, Roberts &
Hite, supra note 97 (2/3 favor progressivity; 1/3 flat tax). However, Turnier et. al. find
less support for a progressive role. According to them, only a slight majority of re-
spondents believe a progressive tax is somewhat or very fair. Turnier et. al., supra
note 122, supported it. Turnier's data is based on the Fall 1992 Southern Focus Poll,
which found geographic variations for support of progressivity-58.7% of southern
respondents found progressivity fair while 65.8% of non-southerners did. Southern
Focus Poll, Q.110 at p. 56. Turnier's percentages were weighted to reflect national
demographics. Turnier, supra note 122, at 35. Despite the findings favoring progres-
sivity in Roberts & Hite, supra note 97, the two authors, along with Cassie F. Bradley,
found in another study that while respondents favor progressivity in the abstract, that
preference changes to a preference for a flat tax when concrete examples are given
which mention actual dollar amounts of income and tax. Roberts, Hite & Bradley,
Attitudes Toward Progressive Taxation, 58 PuB. Op. Q. 165, 182 (1994). This seems to
contradict their earlier study, although it is hard to tell since the questions used in the
earlier study are not duplicated in their article. These two studies starkly highlight the
language sensitivity and general difficulty of interpreting data in this area.
Over the past year, poll results seem more volatile than ever. This is most likely
due to the increased attention and intense rhetoric politicians are now devoting to the
issue. Some studies still show strong support for a progressive income tax. See, e.g.,
Tax Overhaul? Yes. Flat Tax? Not So Fast, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28, 1995, at Al (two-
thirds of poll respondents say the current tax is unfair; 51% want a "complete over-
haul," but by a 3 to 2 margin they favor graduated rates). On the other hand, many
polls show increased support for a flat tax. See, e.g., Rep. Dick Anmey, Armey News
Release on Polls on Flat Tax, 95 TAX NOTEs TODAY 98-46 (May 17, 1995), available in
WESTLAW, TNT database. Armey's press release cites among other polls a News-
week poll which he claims shows that Americans want a flat tax by a margin of 2 to 1.
While the poll did indeed show that 61% of respondents preferred either a 20% or a
17% flat income tax to the current tax, that response does not necessarily mean that
people would favor a flat tax over a broader, more comprehensive (and therefore
having lower rates) graduated tax. This illustrates, once again, the delicacy with which
the question must be phrased and the answer interpreted. Reading the documents in
the Westlaw Poll-C database under "flat and income" is instructive. The exercise
shows not only how responses vary with the phrasing of the question, but also how
they change over time. Current polls show much more opposition to a progressive tax
(compared to a flat tax) in the past year than previously. The rise in popularity of a
flat tax must be viewed against a backdrop of highly charged political rhetoric which
plays on the dislike of taxes. The rhetoric stresses an ideal low flat tax in contrast to
the current actual tax. The rhetoric thus contrasts perfect oranges with wormy apples.
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This Part's brief survey of empirical data on distributive justice
reveals great consistency at the general level, but some inconsisten-
cies in the detail. At the most general level, many studies reveal
that most Americans believe in the principle of equal opportunity.
Additionally, they believe that for the most part it exists. Conse-
quently, Americans generally believe that a just distribution is one
that occurs according to merit. This is in accord with the tradition
of negative liberty. Merit distribution and negative liberty cause
the question of whether a tax is fair to focus on the result to the
individual. Since Americans tend to believe they deserve what in-
come they receive (i.e. it is a result of talent and effort not luck), a
just tax-based solely on a merit criterion-would be either an
amount equal to the benefits one received from the government
(fiscal-exchange theory) or a proportionate amount (a flat tax pre-
Moreover, it often ignores the fact that many of the current flat-tax proposals elimi-
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mised on the assumption that governmental benefits are propor-
tionately distributed). Merit-based determinations of a tax's
fairness hinges on self-interest. However, data shows that "fairness
and self-interest [are] distinguishable" in public policy decisions,
generally and specifically in the tax area.14 This distinction exists
because negative liberty and merit distribution are mediated by
positive liberty (or pre-conditions of liberty) as well as by failures
to achieve equal opportunity. These forces cause people to support
some distribution by need. The more one supports the need princi-
ple the more one is likely to support a progressive tax. 125
The two criteria of need and merit play themselves out in a
mildly-progressive income tax that generally supports unequal dis-
tributions because of a theoretical belief in merit distribution and a
practical belief that income has in fact been so distributed. Never-
theless, most people think their taxes are too high. This opinion,
however, does not necessarily reflect their beliefs about distribu-
tive justice; it may reflect their beliefs about how the government
spends the taxes, their beliefs about the role of government, or sim-
ply the phrasing of the questions in the study. Most people support
income inequality but would lessen the amount. Here inconsisten-
cies in the studies seem most apparent: some showing that the pre-
ferred way to narrow the gap is by raising the bottom; others by
lowering the top. These inconsistencies do not deny the existence
of a consensus on standards of distribution. Rather, they merely
reflect differences in their application to a specific situation or sim-
ply reflect procedural differences in the studies.
Conclusion
For over 80 years the United States has had a progressive income
tax system, and for 80 years that system has been criticized. 126 De-
124. Roberts & Hite, supra note 97, at 27.
125. Supporters of progressive rates are less concerned about their own tax burdens
than flat tax supporters and more likely to view their tax as fair even though they get
governmental benefits that are smaller than their taxes. Roberts & Hite, supra note
97, at 43.
126. See, e.g., Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad, 240 U.S. 1, 25 (1916) (upholding
the constitutionality of the first income tax passed under the sixteenth amendment,
including its progressive feature); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Section 1031: We Don't
Need Another Hero, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 397, 431-435 (1987)(describing the push for a
national sales tax-or even a cash-flow type expenditure tax-in the 1920s); DAVID
BRADFORD, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAx REFORM (1984)(discussing the renewed in-
terest in a cash-flow consumption tax in the 1970s); William Andrews, A Consump-
tion-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1113 (1974)(same);
Michael Graetz, Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 HARv. L. REV.
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spite this continuous criticism, the progressive income tax has en-
dured. Its contradictions and inconsistencies also have endured,
despite incessant "reforms." The key to the tenacity of both the
criticism and the contradictions lies in the American sense of what
constitutes a fair or just tax. The multi-dimensional nature of this
sense of fairness creates an inherent tension in our tax system: any
tax structure we choose will contain its own contradictions and will
elicit criticisms. Consequently, even if the current calls to abandon
the progressive income tax for a flat income tax-or more radi-
cally, a consumption or expenditure based tax-are successful, the
new tax will contain (if not immediately, then soon thereafter)
many of the same contradictions that exist in our present system.
The contradictions are not inherent in any particular tax system but
in our sense of distributive justice.
This sense of justice is shaped by our political traditions of lib-
erty and equality and by our moral tradition of elevating hard work
to a spiritual level. This historical grounding of distributive justice
means that out of all the various definitions of equality and liberty,
three have particular resonance: negative liberty, equal opportu-
nity, and equality based on merit. These principles are central to
American ideology. Americans believe in these principles both as
ideals to strive for and, to a more limited extent, as current reali-
ties. These beliefs exist to varying degrees across cultural groups,
despite the existence of competing conceptions of liberty and
equality. Specifically, negative liberty and equality of opportu-
nity-coupled with a belief in the moral worthiness of effort and
hard work-create an equality of desert or merit based on individ-
ual effort and skill. Together these principles justify an extremely
uneven distribution of wealth.
The principles of negative liberty, equality of opportunity and
equality of desert are tempered, however, by other principles
which argue for less unequal wealth distributions. Negative liberty
itself possesses mediating factors. It recognizes that a person needs
enough physical goods so that she can act as a free moral agent.
These requirements are the preconditions of liberty (or minimal
positive liberties) which lead to a distribution based on equality of
(minimum) need.
While equality of merit (based on effort and skill) is a non-egali-
tarian distributive principle, our tradition also supports more egali-
tarian meanings of equality. Our democratic form of government
1575 (1979)(same); and the mid 1980s campaign that led to the flattened three-tier
rates in the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
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requires a strict equality in the political sphere: one vote per per-
son.1 27 Moreover, this belief in political strict equality moderates
our support of unequal distributions in the economic sphere even if
they are the result of equal opportunity and merit. We fear great
wealth disparities because we fear that great concentrations of
wealth will create concentrations of power which will destroy our
political equality.
Our belief in political equality also tempers our belief in merit-
based equality. The principle of political equality emanates from
our belief that all people are created equal. This is-at bottom-a
belief that the fundamental quality of man is an equality of moral
worthiness. How can we "merit" the rewards of our talents, skills,
and efforts when we acquire the genes that create these talents,
skills, and efforts by luck. Carried to the extreme, all that is left to
determine merit is moral worthiness and since we are all morally
equal, then the distributions of goods ought to be more or less
equal. This, in fact, is the motivating force behind John Rawls'
original position.128 This belief in moral and political equality con-
flicts with our belief in moral economic individualism which finds
moral worthiness in effort and its material rewards. The contradic-
tory pull of the various facets of our tradition means we support
wealth and income disparities but only within limits; we support
merit-based equality that creates income disparities, but we recog-
nize an underlying moral equality that argues against great dispari-
ties; and we support negative liberty but recognize an equality of
(minimum) needs.
In the tax area, the tradition manifests itself in both the overall
structure of the existing tax code (the Code) and in specific sec-
tions. Merit equality, equality of opportunity, and needs equality
all exert their influences. The result is an often contradictory tax
law whose contradictions result not simply from politics but from
an underlying complex sense of distributive justice.
The minimum-needs criterion is reflected in the basic structure
of the Code as well as specific sections. This criterion is in accord-
ance with the ability to pay rationale and the mildly graduated
rates of our current tax system. Income used to meet basic mainte-
nance needs is non-discretionary and therefore not available for
tax payments. One's ability to pay taxes is measured only by dis-
127. But see Guinier, supra note 81 (advocating group voting rights).
128. JOSEPH & SumvorioN, supra note 54, at 92. The authors state, however, the
original position "does not get us anywhere unless we happen to agree with [Rawls]
that nullifying the accident of natural endowment is a good thing to do." Id.
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cretionary income-by subtracting out amounts needed for basic
subsistence. Marital status and number of children, both of which
are provided for in the Code, 129 are two rough measurements of
subsistence needs. The § 63(c) standard deduction is another ex-
ample of a needs-based provision. In fact, the 1986 Tax Reform
Act's increase of both the standard deduction and the personal ex-
emption amounts was aimed at removing needy people from the
tax rolls. Similarly, the constant expansion of the § 32 earned in-
come credit represents a desire to provide relief for low-income
taxpayers (as well as to provide a work incentive). 130 A needs-
based distribution criterion also (roughly) justifies tax provisions
that provide for credits for the elderly and the handicapped, medi-
cal deductions, casualty losses, perhaps the home mortgage interest
deduction, and even to some extent the life insurance exclusion.
Deferral of taxation on qualified pension plans and individual re-
tirement accounts also can be seen as needs based to the extent
that they encourage people to save for their retirement when they
will need the savings to live on.
Tax deferral for income saved for retirement is available only for
earned income not investment income because of a long-standing
belief that people with earned income have less ability to pay taxes
than those with unearned income from investments. As John Stu-
art Mill stated, people who earn their income through their own
efforts should be taxed more lightly than the person who earned
his money from investments because the former has "smaller
means" and "greater necessities.' 1 31 A wage earner's means were
smaller because she had a limited working life in which to earn her
money whereas investments can earn money indefinitely; she had
greater necessity because out of this temporary income she had to
save money to provide for illness, retirement, and death. Mill be-
lieved that the ideal solution was to exempt savings from taxation,
129. See, e.g., Alves & Rossi, supra note 115, at 551-55 (finding that their respon-
dents were less generous in allowing for children than was Code § 151). Marital sta-
tus, of course, is accounted for in the § 1 rate schedules which provide lower rates for
a married couple than a single individual with the same amount of income. The joint
return's origin lies in two 1930 Supreme Court decisions: Poe v. Seaburn, 282 U.S.
101 (1930), and Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930). As a result of these two cases, a
husband could split his earned income for tax purposes with his wife if he lived in a
community property state but not if he lived in a common law state. Nevertheless,
theoretical justifications for permitting joint returns that reduce but do not split the
tax burden for married couples include the idea of need-that two can live more
cheaply than one.
130. See, e.g., 1986-3 C.B. 43 (legislative history of earned income credit).
131. 2 MILL, supra note 26, at 315 (Bk.V, Ch.II).
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but since that was impractical (due to taxpayer fraud), there should
be a lower tax rate on the amount of earned income a person
should save. 32 Throughout much of the United States' income tax
history, earned income has received some preference either due to
the belief in greater need due to the uncertainties of earned in-
come 133 or more recently for economic reasons such as to en-
courage work1 34 or savings. 135  However, the needs aspect of
earned income must to some extent remain underneath the eco-
nomic reason because tax deferral for savings only applies to
earned income.
The Code's treatment of the principle of equality of opportunity
is less clear than its treatment of the needs-based principle. For the
most part, the Code is silent, apparently assuming such equality
already exists. However, many of the sections I have listed as
needs based could also be viewed as attempts to help provide equal
132. Id. at 319. Mill also developed another rationale for exempting savings: the
double tax theory. Under this theory, all savings should be exempt from tax because
if they are not, then they are taxed twice-once when earned and again when the
saved money earns interest. See Kaldor, supra note 26, at 11-17. For a summary of
the development of Mill's position, see F. SHEHAB, PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 92-94,
101-02, 104-05, 125-26, 133-36, 145-46, 150-54 (1954). Mill, in short, originally sup-
ported a (partial) consumption or expenditure-based tax for the sake of favoring
earned income. Ironically, a full broad-based expenditure tax ends up being a tax on
wages, since all savings are exempted, even savings which are earned from unearned
income.
133. The 1913 Act did not differentiate because Congress thought it was too diffi-
cult to distinguish between earned and unearned income. H.R. Rep. No. 767, 65th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 4-5. The same reason-administrative difficulty-was given in 1926
for not enacting a preference. See, e.g., 61 CONG. REC. 6670 (Oct. 24, 1926) (state-
ment of Sen. Penrose). The first preference, passed in 1924, provided for a 25% re-
duction of the rate for the first $10,000 of "earned income". Revenue Act of 1924, ch.
234, § 209(a)(3), 43 Stat. 263 (1924). In recommending its passage, Secretary of Treas-
ury Andrew Miller justified it on the grounds of the uncertainty and limited duration
of earned income: sickness, death, and old age diminish or destroy it. See Hearings
on H.R. 6715 Before the Comm. on Finance, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (March 7-April
8, 1924) (Statement by A. W. Gregg, Special Assistant to the Treasury Secretary), in 2
INTERNAL REVENUE ACrs OF THE UNITED STATES 1909-1950 (B. Reams, Jr. ed.
1979); ANDREW MELLON, TAXATION: THE PEOPLE'S BUSINESS 56 (1924); H.R. Rep.
No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1924). This reason was bolstered by a moral factor
which saw earned income as more meritorious than unearned income. See, e.g., 50
CONG. REC. 3818 (Aug. 27, 1913) (it is necessary to distinguish between the salary of a
professional man who "giv[es] his brain and his ability to serve his fellow men" and
the income of a man who inherits property and "is a drone and an idler...").
134. For example, the 50% maximum tax on earned income from 1970-1981. The
primary purpose of that provision, however, was to prevent "tax gimmickry" such as
deferred compensation and conversion of ordinary income into capital gains. See
Michael Asimow, Section 1348: The Death of Mickey Mouse?, CAL. L. REV. 801, 865
(1970).
135. Individual retirement accounts, for example.
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opportunity. The earned income credit and credit for the handi-
capped, for example, can be viewed as attempts to level the playing
field.
Certain provisions that give tax benefits to employers or busi-
nessmen also can be viewed as implementing the equal opportunity
principle because the tax incentives are designed to encourage op-
portunities. Section 38 general business credits such as the
targeted jobs credit (§ 51), the low-income housing credit (§ 42),
the empowerment zone employment credit (§ 1396), and the In-
dian employment credit (§ 45A) fall into this category.
The Code also implements the principle of distribution according
to desert or merit. The general rate structure of the Code, in fact,
basically supports this principle despite its progressive nature. The
effective rates are so mildly graduated that the result is a general
endorsement of the inequality of merit distribution with a nod to
need distribution. Moreover, specific provisions give particular re-
wards for effort and risk-taking-the entrepreneurship we find so
morally bracing. The capital gains preference is a classic example
of this as are non-recognition provisions such as tax-free reorgani-
zations. Some sections specifically promote small-scale entrepre-
neurship such as § 1244 (allowing recognition of ordinary losses on
small business stock), § 1202 (50% exclusion of gain from certain
small business stock), § 1044 (deferral on gain when proceeds are
invested in "small business investment companies"), and the S cor-
poration provisions, §§ 1361-1378 (which effectively eliminate the
corporate double-tax system for certain kinds of domestic
corporations).
The income tax provisions described in the previous paragraphs
may cause the tax system to appear contradictory, even incoherent.
Although this may be true at a superficial level, it is not true at a
deeper level. The Code's blend of income and consumption fea-
tures, its various provisions which favor earned and unearned in-
come, and its progressive rates which "fail" to radically redistribute
wealth are not merely the result of political manipulation and com-
promise. The income-tax laws did not fail to radically redistribute
wealth because Congress never intended them to do so. Contradic-
tory provisions are permanent, not transitory, features of the Code.
The Code, however, is not incoherent because there is a pattern to
these inconsistencies. This Article has shown that they all reflect a
deep-seated multi-faceted sense of distributive justice which
emerges from an American tradition which emphasizes negative
liberty, equality of opportunity, and merit equality. While these
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principles exert competing, often conflicting, influences on the
Code, they operate within the framework of that tradition, which
sets limits on the competing forces. It is the center without which
things fall apart. The income tax is complex and contradictory be-
cause we ourselves have complex, often contradictory beliefs about
equality, liberty, and distributive justice.
The enactment of any of the current proposals to reform or abol-
ish the progressive income tax will not eliminate the contradictions
in our tax system. The same (or similar) contradictions will simply
reappear (at enactment or soon thereafter) in any replacement tax.
These contradictions do not inhere in the income tax but in our
sense of distributive justice. We cannot escape them by changing
taxes because the fault, if fault it be, "is not in our stars,/But in
ourselves. "136
136. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR, Act I, Scene II.
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